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strategy explodes the myth of a monolithic, intransigent state, and portrays government 
rather as a framework that structures social struggle. 
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analyze the role and effects of local government offices charged with the implementation 
of land reform legislation.  I argue that the hierarchy of local government constitutes a 
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movement.  I argue that the organization’s success is largely due to its dual role as both 
agitator and embedded bureaucratic facilitator within the government hierarchy.  I then 
examine qualitative evidence that could complement (and point up shortcomings of) 
Section 2’s quantitative analysis.  I conclude by examining avenues for future research 
and making policy recommendations for Navsarjan and for the state. 
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No collection of wealth must be made by a Sudra, even though he be able (to do it); for a 
Sudra who has acquired wealth gives pains to the Brahmanas. 
—The Laws of Manu (tr. G. Buehler, in Mueller 1964, 430), Chapter X, Verse 28. 
 
 
You know in South Africa our people are fighting for their rights. Here in India there are 
no laws depriving the people of the right of owning land or living wherever they please. 
It is true we have reduced Harijans [Dalits] to some such condition but for the rest of 
society that is not so. 
—Mahatma Gandhi 
Speaking at a prayer meeting in New Delhi 
28 January, 1948 
 
 
You are made to suffer want, privations and humiliations not because it was preordained 
by the sins committed in your previous birth but because of the overpowering tyranny 
and treachery of those who are about you.  You have no lands because others usurped 
them; you have no posts because others have monopolized them.  Do not believe in fate.  
Believe in your strength. 
—B.R. Ambedkar 
 
 
Businessmen, they drink my wine, plowmen dig my earth; 
None of them along the line know what any of it is worth. 
—Bob Dylan, “All Along the Watchtower” 
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1. LAND REDISTRIBUTION IN THE GUJARATI CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
1.1. The Purpose of This Study 
This study seeks to answer the question: How does government’s implementation of land 
reforms in Gujarat, India inform Dalit (i.e., ‘Outcaste’) activism for land redistribution?  
For millennia, Dalits have been a landless people, and their struggle to bring about land 
redistribution speaks to the larger problem of mobilizing effectively to convert a 
hierarchical society into an egalitarian one.  A better understanding of this process in the 
world’s largest and most complex democracy will, I believe, prove crucial for academics 
and policymakers alike in designing democratic institutions intended to quell ethnic strife.  
Ultimately, this study aims to shed light on both the potential and the limits of 
redistributive policy interventions in the context of complex social realities. 
 
The study examines the efforts of the Navsarjan Trust (or simply Navsarjan) in 
advocating for Dalit land rights in Surendranagar district, Gujarat.  This organization is 
arguably the most efficacious Dalit activist group in Gujarat.  A large part of its 
programmatic budget and scope is dedicated to the redistribution of agricultural lands 
from the upper-castes and state government to the often-landless Dalits.  The Dalit 
activist movement, including Navsarjan, largely interprets Indian society’s often-rigid, 
caste-based socioeconomic stratifications as reinforcing an inequitable economic order.  It 
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also contends that land tenure patterns underpin socioeconomic stratification by 
systematically marginalizing agricultural laborers and rendering the asset-building 
process slow or impossible.  Critically, this struggle is embedded in two competing 
normative frameworks: the liberal-democratic egalitarianism espoused by the post-
colonial state, and the pervasive structure of informal, caste-based codes of conduct. 
 
I argue that Gujarati land reform activism does not follow the intuitively sensible model 
of activist movements in which the political actions of the state have a centralizing effect, 
in turn provoking countervailing reactions from the marginalized periphery (often 
referred to as “movement and counter-movement,” as espoused, for instance, by 
Ercegovac [1999]).  That story may well characterize activist movements dedicated to 
separatism.  However, the Dalit activist struggle does not seek secession from Indian 
society, but rather its radical, egalitarian restructuring.  A theory of central action and 
peripheral reaction cannot adequately explain the purposive formation of the Dalit land 
movement in the face of (a) progressive federal and state laws ostensibly fostering Dalit 
land rights, and (b) a robust bureaucracy charged with their implementation. 
 
I contend that the Dalit land movement has instead implicitly recognized a complex 
reality: the outcomes of state policy on the ground are the products of a struggle between 
caste members occurring within a nested hierarchy of local government institutions.  To 
borrow a phrase from Rajagopal (2005), local government institutions constitute a 
“terrain of contestation” (ibid., 183).  Rajagopal argues that popular struggles have an 
ambivalent relationship with the law, as it may either preserve the societal and power 
status quo, or alternatively provide space for resistance.  Rajagopal makes this argument 
 15
in the context of social movements resorting to the courts to fight for their cause—in 
other words, a homegrown attempt to establish legal precedent that will effectively shape 
public policy from the ground up.  However, in the present case, the social movement is 
no longer trying to shape the law from below, but to assure implementation of the law 
from above.  Similarly, many studies have focused on rural minority efforts to influence 
democratic processes (see, e.g., Basu and Kohli 1998, Varshney 1995, and Kohli 2001), 
while relatively few have examined how policies adopted by the “empirical” state may 
mutate as they filter down and come into progressively closer contact with informal 
normative frameworks of social organization.  I therefore contend that the battle waged 
on Rajagopal’s contested terrain shifts, for the most part, from the court system or 
legislative institutions to the hierarchy of local governments charged with implementing 
legislation favorable to the social movement.   I contend that Navsarjan’s strategy is to 
modify the strength of the links between levels in this nested game—oftentimes by 
allowing Dalit land appeals to bypass lower, less progressive levels of government in 
favor of higher ones—in order to produce favorable results for the Dalit land rights 
movement.    This strategy explodes the myth of a monolithic, intransigent state, and 
portrays government rather as a framework that structures social struggle.  Furthermore, 
Navsarjan’s experience hints that the role of a social movement in relation to the state is 
not purely antagonistic, but may also be facultative.  That is, the movement may fill a 
functional gap in the state bureaucracy and consequently advance its own ideology and 
interests. 
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1.2. The Organization and Methods of This Study 
This study’s main investigation is broken into three sections.  Section 1 serves as a 
general introduction to the historical, legal, and philosophical context of Gujarati land 
reforms.  It argues generally that land redistribution is seen as a means to verticalizing 
horizontal ethnic stratifications.  Subsection 1.3 examines the history of Gujarati land 
reforms since Indian independence with special attention to state legislation aiming at 
land redistribution. 1  In describing the legislation, I rely on the Gujarat State Codes, as 
well as interpretations from secondary literature.  In Subsection 1.4, I describe the 
Marxian ideological underpinnings of land redistribution in the Dalit activist tradition that 
depict normative social structures as arising fundamentally from land relations.  
 
In Section 2, I quantitatively analyze the role and effects of local government offices 
charged with the implementation of land reform legislation.  I argue that the hierarchy of 
local government constitutes a nested battleground, on which the interests of Dalits and 
the upper-castes vie for influence.  I justify the use of a quantitative analysis in what 
might otherwise have been a qualitative study in three ways.  First, Navsarjan may choose 
to use this study’s findings when filing future suits, and will benefit from the “hard” data 
analysis of survey data.  Second, depending on who in the land reform process is giving 
the interview (e.g., Dalit farmers, government officials of various stripes, or Navsarjan 
                                                 
1
 While I will use the words “redistribute” and “redistribution” to refer to any government-mandated act that 
has the effect of transferring land to or from a specified demographic group, Indian officials in with the 
Indian Administrative Service use these words only in reference to a government-mandated act that has the 
effect of transferring lands from one private holder to another.  Therefore, the Government Lands 
Programme, which distributes idle government lands to poor would-be farmers (as discussed in Section 2) is 
not officially termed “redistribution.”  The advantage of my definition lies mainly in the fact that 
government lands prior to redistribution are oftentimes unofficially in use, either as illicitly cultivated plots 
or as village commons.  27.6% of allotted government lands surveyed are still partially or entirely 
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activist fieldworkers), there are contradictory accounts of the relative importance of 
government facilitation, type of land redistributed, local social pressures, and Dalit 
“mindsets” in successful Dalit land cultivation.  A quantitative analysis may go some way 
toward parsing the relative weight of each factor, allowing me to hold constant 
confounding variables.  Third, because Navsarjan relies on the meticulous and 
quantitative cataloguing of government failures in the land reform process, following a 
similar strategy may prove revelatory of Navsarjan’s own agenda in defining 
government’s obligations toward civil society and the definitional composition of that 
civil society.  Ultimately, then, this study will attempt to transcend the reliance on 
quantitative data, bearing in mind that Navsarjan’s relentless documentation of the worst 
cases skews its view and its portrayal of the rural Dalit plight, as well as the government’s 
moral responsibility for addressing it. 
 
In Section 3, I examine Navsarjan’s tactics in the land redistribution movement.  I argue 
that the organization’s success is largely due to its instinctive understanding of the nested 
game being played in the government hierarchy.  I then examine qualitative evidence that 
could complement (and point up shortcomings of) Section 2’s quantitative analysis.  I 
conclude by examining avenues for future research and making policy recommendations 
for Navsarjan and for the state. 
 
Information Sources.  Section 1 is entirely based on information available in the public 
domain (aside from some observations on the philosophy of the Navsarjan Trust in 
                                                                                                                                                 
encroached upon, versus 43.0% of “redistributed lands.”  Furthermore, from the perspective of the Dalit 
movement, the socioeconomic impact of the two types of land reform may be similar or even identical. 
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Subsection 1.4.4).  For my exposition on local government officials’ responsibilities and 
relationships in Section 2.1, I rely primarily on interviews with officials in Surendranagar 
district and Navsarjan fieldworkers who have experience navigating the bureaucracy, as 
well as focus group discussions with Dalits who applied for redistributable lands.  I 
administered these interviews and focus groups discussions in July of 2006 and January 
of 2007.  The quantitative analysis of land reform implementation in Subsection 2.2 
relies primarily on the second of two Navsarjan-administered surveys (administered in 
1996 and 2006 respectively) discussed below. 
 
Navsarjan administered two surveys to Dalit recipients of redistributed land.  The first 
survey was written by Navsarjan and administered in various talukas and districts of 
peninsular Saurashtra in 1995-19962, with special emphasis on four talukas of 
Surendranagar district that became the touchstone for Navsarjan’s later Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) in the Gujarat High Court (discussed in Subection 1.3.3).  These talukas 
were namely: Lakhtar, Limbdi, Sayla, and Vadhwan.  They constitute the first areas in 
which Navsarjan field staff began working with local Dalits, informing them of their legal 
rights under the land codes, and whistleblowing in those cases where their rights were 
infringed.  Navsarjan included the survey results in tabular form in a self-published 
document entitled “The Story of Land Reforms in Gujarat” (Navsarjan 2000a). 
 
The second survey was written in July of 2006 by the Navsarjan’s Land Redistribution 
Programme fieldworkers, in consultation with me.  It focused on only the four previously-
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mentioned talukas of Surendranagar district.  This survey’s intended function was to 
assess the impact of the High Court’s ruling of 1999, which mandated local governments 
to expedite the handover of lands officially redistributed to Dalits, but to whom actual 
possession was, in reality, denied (see Subection 1.3.3).  The second survey was 
administered over a period of four months, from August to December 20063.  In order to 
be able to hold as many variables constant as possible when analyzing government’s 
relationship to the efficacy of land redistribution, I have also appended via cross-reference 
two separate data sources: (1) the India Census 2001, and (2) the state’s Below Poverty 
Line listing for Surendranagar district.4 
 
Both surveys focused on talukas that Navsarjan staff deemed to pose particular problems 
for Dalit land recipients.  In 1995, Martin Macwan, founder of Navsarjan, obtained land 
records from individual Mamlatdar offices in the nine Surendranagar talukas.  For their 
first survey, Navsarjan fieldworkers chose talukas based on the number of cited land 
disputes.  The intense clustering of tenure problems in the chosen talukas may more 
vividly evoke qualitative descriptions of problems associated with obstacles to Dalit 
cultivation than more progressive talukas (where such problems might be subtler in form, 
or even nonexistent).  However, the data obtained from such a biased sample cannot be 
used statistically to infer the incidence of land tenure problems for Dalits in other 
districts, or even in other talukas of Surendranagar district.  In order to render the surveys 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 These talukas and districts included: Degham taluka in Gandhinagar district, Harij taluka in Patan district, 
Jasdan taluka in Rajkot district, Sami taluka in Patan district, Vallabhipur taluka in Bhavnagar district, and 
Viramgam taluka in Ahmedabad district. 
3
 N = 721, where the unit of analysis is the household.  All Dalit land recipients were interviewed in each 
surveyed village, and 129 villages were surveyed. 
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comparable to one another, the same talukas were targeted in the 2006 survey as in that of 
1995.  However, irregularities in the 1995 data made time-elapse data analysis 
impossible.  Therefore, when I compare the 1995 and 2006 surveys in Subsection 2.4, the 
talukas do not match. 
 
Throughout quantitative analysis, it should be borne in mind that Navsarjan, as an activist 
organization, has a clear agenda.  That agenda, as is discussed further in Subsection 1.4, 
is based on the proposition that land ownership for Dalits is an unmitigated social good.  
The survey enumerators are also well-known in the communities they covered, and often 
serve as Dalit cultivators’ most direct line of communication to local government 
officials.  This fact may be at once considered beneficial and a drawback in survey 
enumeration.  On the one hand, many Dalit farmers are leery of speaking with outsiders 
about land issues for fear of retribution.  Therefore, Navsarjan’s long, slow accumulation 
of trust in hundreds of villages across the state presumably fosters a freer expression of 
local concerns.  However, Navsarjan’s enigmatic role as community organizer, agitator, 
and even proxy government representative, may also encourage unfounded claims to 
land—a suspicion confirmed by some of my field interviews. 
 
The entirety of Section 3 is based upon qualitative information gleaned in the course of 
interviews, as well as on quantitative data from the preceding Section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 For the latter, I am deeply grateful to the activist documentary film organization Drishti, and in particular 
Siddharth Chadha and Stalin K., as it was they who filed the application for the information with the state 
under the Right to Information Act. 
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1.3. A Brief History of Land Redistribution in Gujarat Since Independence 
The history of legal reform in Gujarat is Janus-faced: the state is both famed for its 
progressive land policies, and notorious for its recalcitrance (Navsarjan 2000a).  This 
bifurcated reputation stems primarily from two politico-historical facts.  The first is not 
be taken up in this thesis, but nonetheless deserves mention: the administrative territory 
of the present state of Gujarat forms a composite of two former territories with disparate 
administrative legacies.  (This history is briefly summed up in Section 1.3.1.)  The 
second politico-historical fact is at the core of this thesis’s focus: Gujarat has a history of 
introducing progressive legislation at the state level that is not efficaciously carried out on 
the ground. 
 
1.3.1. The Administration of Post-Independence Gujarat  
On 23 January 1948, the Kathiawar rulers approved the creation of Saurastra province 
(footnoted in Gandhi 1995), embracing 217 separate princely states in Saurashtra and 
Kathiawar.  Then in 1957, Saurashtra province in its entirety was appended to what was 
now called the Greater Bombay State.  Finally in 1960, in accordance with a much-
debated national policy of state reorganization along linguistic lines5, the state of Bombay 
was split into the present-day states of Maharashtra and Gujarat (Shah, in Omvedt 1982).  
To complicate things further, certain districts in Gujarat had been, in colonial times, 
formally administered by the British, while the vast majority of the districts now making 
                                                 
5
 The India National Congress party had long supported the policy of linguistically-determined 
administrative boundaries.  However, the party leader and first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
was gravely concerned that the idea of linguistic determination that had fueled his party’s popular success 
might also lead to an India too riven by language groups to function collectively.  After serving on the 
Linguistic Committee, Nehru ruefully recalled: 
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up Gujarat (including all of those in Saurashtra) were administered by so-called “Native 
states” (Iyer 1997). 
                                                                                                                                                 
Some of the ablest men in the country came before us and confidently and emphatically stated that language 
in this country stood for and represented culture, race, history, individuality, and finally a subnation.  (Cited 
in Geertz 1973, 256) 
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Figure 1.3.1-1. Map of present-day Gujarat and its administrative districts. 
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1.3.2. Gujarati Land Reform Legislation 
Three principal pieces of legislation shape the process of land redistribution: the Land 
Tenancy Act (1948), the Land Ceiling Act (1960), and the Government Lands 
Programme.  The first has been mostly ineffectual and its consequences have largely 
already played out.  Consequently, Government officials under pressure to redistribute 
lands to the Dalit community usually choose to redistribute either “surplus” lands (also 
called “ceiling lands”) declared under the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, or “government 
wastelands” as specified under the Government Lands Programme. 
 
The Land Tenancy Act (1948).  The Land Tenancy Act of 1948 constitutes the first 
post-independence national land act.  For both British-administered and native territories, 
Indian independence legislation meant the end of the zamindari system.  Under this 
system, absentee feudal landlords, or zamindars, collected revenues for the Mughal and 
British governments from renters.  The latter in turn used employed and bonded labor to 
cultivate the fields.  And while independence saw a large devolution of land rights from 
zamindars to upper- and middle-caste renters, these reforms did not reach the lower-
castes, whose members actually tilled the land (Mearns and Sinha 1999).  Ironically, the 
post-independence reforms actually encouraged the middle-caste recipients of land to 
kick agricultural laborers off their land in order to reduce their legal claim to it 
(Chakravarti, in Mohanty 2004).  Chakravarti claims that the middle- and upper-castes 
were able to prevent any further devolution of land rights because (1) the upper-castes 
held sway over reform administrators, and (2) the forward castes were able via social 
pressure to repress members of the lower-castes who attempted to organize against them 
(ibid.).  Furthermore, the 26 amendments tacked on to the legislation at various times 
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generated a fair amount of confusion among would-be beneficiaries, and of the 2.5 
million acres originally foreseen changing hands, only around 1.2 million ever did so 
(Navsarjan 2000a). 
 
The Land Tenancy Act granted all land tenants the right to purchase the land they 
cultivated from the current landlords (though only around 2% did so).  The 1957 
amendment to the act simply banned the practice of land tenancy (i.e., sharecropping) 
outright.  This ban effectively forced tenants to buy or quit the land, but its simplicity 
proved impractical and often served to nullify existing claims that could not be readily 
substantiated or paid for (Chakravarti, in Mohanty 2004; Navsarjan 2000a).  The net 
effect was that ‘surplus’ landholdings belonging to Brahmans and other upper castes 
devolved principally to middle-castes, but not to lower castes and Dalits.  In Gujarat, this 
process led to the economic dominance of the Patels that continues to this day (Navsarjan 
2000a). 
 
The Agricultural Land Ceiling Act (1960).  The 1960 Gujarat Agricultural Land 
Ceiling Act figures prominently among Gujarat’s progressive land measures.  The Act 
fixed the maximum land area tenable by a single owner in a rural sector at 132 acres (later 
reduced to 54 acres in the 1976 amendment) (Jindal 1985) and dictated that the surplus be 
allotted to Dalits (outcastes), tribal peoples, and Other Backward Castes (OBCs).  The 
Act came early in a period defined by similar legislation passing in various other states 
(Srivastava 2006).  It was designed to further devolve land ownership to the lower castes 
whom the Land Tenancy Act had largely failed to reach.  In combination with the 
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Government Lands Programme (see below), the state Agricultural Land Ceiling Acts 
have—at least on paper—generally worked to some degree (see, e.g., APPENDIX A). 
 
If the ALCAs have bolstered inter-caste land ownership equity, however, they have 
seemingly also lessened intra-caste land equity.  Table 1.3.2-1 displays the percentage of 
landholdings of vulnerable demographics by size category in India as a whole in 1982 and 
again in 1992.  The trend clearly emerges of larger numbers of smaller holdings.  When 
this data is used to derive Lorenz curves (see Figure 1.3.2-1),6 two interesting findings 
present themselves.  First, the degree of inequality is systematically higher among Dalits 
than among Scheduled Tribes, and is again higher among Scheduled Tribes than among 
OBCs.  Second, during the period in question, even as inter-caste equality of land assets 
was presumably on the rise, intra-caste equality of land assets seems to have been on the 
decline.  This trend presents itself in the downward shift in the Lorenz curves for each of 
the three demographic classes of marginalized populations over the decade 1982-1992.  
While other exogenous variables may very well be at work,7 it should be noted that this 
trend may plausibly be explained by postulating a large number of marginal and small 
landholders entering the picture who were not previously taken into account.  Many 
parcel recipients were previously landless agricultural laborers (Srivastava 2006), and 
                                                 
6
 A Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of population inequality using cumulative distribution 
functions.  Perfect equality (all members of a group with equal shares of the variable in question) is 
represented by the 45° line, while perfect inequality (all of the variable in question concentrated in the 
hands of a single person) is represented by the X-axis and the vertical edge of the graph at the 100% mark.  
The Gini Coefficient of inequality is a ratio of (1) the area between the line of perfect equality and the 
observed curve, and (2) the total area between the line of perfect equality and that of perfect inequality.  To 
approximate asset levels for the present exercise, I have assumed for simplicity that marginal plots are 0.5 
hectares, small plots 1.5 hectares, medium plots 3 hectares, and large plots 4 hectares. 
7
 In addition to changes in land tenure relations, Jayaraman and Lanjouw (1998) note agricultural 
intensification and occupational diversification as forces at work in socioeconomic stratification at the 
village level. 
 27
with the all-India average size of awarded plots at around 1 acre (see Table 1.3.2-1), the 
relative size of the marginal and small class of landowners swells.  That said, the rise of 
intra-caste inequality may be unavoidable in a society transforming itself from a ranked to 
an unranked socioeconomic hierarchy, as each social stratum coincides less well with 
economic status (see Section 1.4) and begins to take on the income distribution of the 
society as a whole. 
 
Table 1.3.2-1.  Percentage distribution of ownership holdings among vulnerable populations. 
 
 Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Others (OBCs) 
Size Class 1982 1992 1982 1992 1982 1992 
Marginal (less than 1 ha.) 26.6 30.2 12.0 18.7 10.9 14.9 
Small (1 to 2 ha.) 22.71 22.2 18.8 22.7 15.6 17.5 
Medium (2 to 4 ha.) 24.0 20.4 29.2 27.7 22.6 24.7 
Large (above 4 ha.) 26.8 27.2 40.0 30.9 50.9 42.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: NSS, Land Holding Survey 37th round No. 330 1982 & 48th round No. 399 1992, Central Statistical 
Organisation, Delhi. 
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Figure 1.3.2-1.  Lorenz curves of land asset ownership among vulnerable populations in India (1982-
1992). 
Source: NSS, Land Holding Survey 37th round No. 330 1982 & 48th round No. 399 1992, Central Statistical 
Organisation, Delhi.  Derivations and graph by the author. 
 
To be redistributed under the ALCA, lands must first be declared surplus and then 
navigate a complex bureaucratic system that greatly reduces their chances of successful 
cultivation.  This thesis deals in some detail with the bureaucratic system, but does not 
address (for lack of reliable information) the question of a parcel’s original declaration as 
surplus.  Only 101,700 acres of the 1.35 million acres originally estimated as eligible for 
redistribution in Gujarat (or 7.5%) were in fact declared surplus as of 2000 (Navsarjan 
2000a).  As paltry a sum as this might seem, it is about three times better than the record 
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for India as a whole: about 750,000 acres declared surplus in India out of an original 30 
million estimated (or 2.5%) (National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights 1995). 
 
The Government Lands Programme.  This state government land-leasing program 
authorizes local governments to allot so-called government wastelands to those willing to 
improve them and bring them under cultivation.  It is officially authorized under Chapter 
V of the ALCA (Jindal 1985), but functions differently from its cousin.  The lengths of 
the lease vary from a renewable 1-year contract (prevalent in southern Gujarat) to 99-year 
terms.  The terms in Saurashtra, where Surendranagar district is located, are of the longer 
variety, and so function in effect like fee simple ownership. 
 
In Gujarat, the scale of this program has far outstripped that of the ALCA, for reasons 
elaborated below in Subsection 1.3.4.  For instance, in the southern sub-district of 
Surendranagar comprised of the Chotila, Limbdi, Muli, and Sayla talukas, 64,313 acres of 
government lands have been distributed since 1960 (see Table 1.3.2-2 and Table 
1.3.2-3).  That same sub-district, according to its Deputy Collector, has only distributed 
5,563 acres of lands under the ALCA.  For now, suffice it to state over-simplistically that 
the allotment of state leaseholds is obviously less politically contentious than the 
systematic stripping of private property from powerful upper-caste members, as well as 
being less permanent.  Nevertheless, as with ALCA lands, official documents overstate 
the success of redistribution on the ground. 
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Table 1.3.2-2.  Government lands in the southern sub-district of Surendranagar 
district distributed from 1960 to December 2006, categorized by recipient caste.  
 Distribution by Caste 
Caste Area (Ac.) Recipients Average Area 
(i) Scheduled castes 24,564 3,285 7.5 
(ii) Scheduled tribes 3,618 726 5.0 
(iii) Other beneficiaries 36,131 5,663 6.4 
(iv) Societies/institutions 4,983 4 1245.8 
Total 64,313 9,674 - 
Source: Surendranagar District Land Records Office. 
 
Table 1.3.2-3.  Government lands in the southern sub-district of 
Surendranagar district distributed since 1960, categorized by 
taluka.  
 Distribution by Taluka 
Taluka Area (Ac.) Recipients 
Chotila 17,529 23 
Limbdi 17,627 0 
Muli 16,404 17 
Sayla 12,752 0 
Total 64,312 40 
Source: Surendranagar District Land Records Office. 
 
1.3.3. Navsarjan’s Public Interest Litigation 
As of 1997, approximately 50,000 acres of unused government “wastelands” were 
allotted to landless Dalits.  In 1995-6, the Navsarjan Trust8 administered a survey 
describing the status of government-declared surplus lands, including the nominal area, 
area in Dalit possession, natures of possible encroachment, and the availability of legal 
documentation of land title.  In April 1999, the organization galvanized the local Dalit 
communities in four talukas of Surendranagar district in Saurashtra (namely, Sayla, 
Vadhwan, Limbdi, and Lakhtar), to file a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) in the Gujarat 
High Court against the state, the State Secretary of the Revenue Department, the Special 
                                                 
8
 It is interesting that the group elected to register itself as a “trust” rather than a private NGO.  This fact 
may reflect the desire to be more than “just an organization,” but rather the legal manifestation of a larger 
social movement that welcomes—indeed requires—Dalit stakeholders to buy into the Navsarjan project. 
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Secretary of Revenue for the Appeals Department, and the District Collector of 
Surendranagar District.  In the PIL, Navsarjan documented over 6,000 acres of lands in 
Surendranagar district that had been officially allotted to 700 Dalit families according to 
the District Collector’s office, but which the 1995 survey had found to be either 
unaccompanied by the necessary documentation for recipients to prove title, or not 
actually in the hands of the intended beneficiaries.  The Court ruled that the state must 
complete its survey and distribution of the surplus lands by 15 June 2000.  Navsarjan has 
long suspected that even the Court’s ruling went largely unheeded.  The group recently 
completed a follow-up survey I helped to design to obtain a time-elapse portrait of the 
status of land-holdings in the wake of the ruling. 
 
1.3.4. A Comparative View of the ALCA and Government Lands Program 
How does Gujarat compare to other Indian states in its land redistribution efforts?  Within 
Gujarat, how do the two land redistribution programs compare with one another?  I 
address these two questions in order.  APPENDIX A describes the extent to which 
participating Indian states have implemented land reforms (as of 1996—the year of 
Navsarjan’s first land survey), with special consideration for scheduled caste recipients.  
Here I adapt a simple technique called location quotient (LQ) analysis from regional 
economics (see, e.g., Heilburn 1981, 153-169), and define it in this context as the degree 
to which land redistribution has taken place in Gujarat versus India has a whole.  We may 
state that Gujarat’s location quotient is: 
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  LQ = (rg / pg) / (ri / pi), where: 
rg = redistribution effected in Gujarat (measured either for the class of total 
redistributions or for Dalits, with units in either acres or beneficiaries) 
pg = population of Gujarat (either Dalit or total)9 
ri = redistribution effected in all India 
pi = population of India 
A location quotient of 1 in this case would indicate that the redistribution measures 
undertaken in Gujarat are perfectly commensurate with those undertaken in India as a 
whole.  A location quotient less than 1 would indicate sub-par performance, and a 
location quotient above 1 would indicate superior performance.  The same exercise can 
be performed on the average parcel size allotted (see results in Table 1.3.4-1). 
 
Using this method of data interpretation, Gujarat generally ranks poorly against its state 
competitors.  Gujarat has been just over half as effective as India as a whole in terms of 
per capita acres distributed, and is only 1/8 as effective as other states in terms of per 
capita beneficiaries reached.  The programs seem to fare better when specifically 
targeting Dalits.  Gujarat’s redistribution efforts are roughly twice as effective than other 
states in terms of acres distributed, but only around ¼ as effective in terms of sheer 
numbers of program beneficiaries.  The discrepancy in both cases between acreage-based 
and beneficiary-based location quotients is probably due to the arid environment in 
Gujarat: it simply takes more land to sustain a beneficiary family in Gujarat than in most 
other states, as indicated by the location quotients of 4.4 and 5.4 respectively assessing 
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average parcel size of redistributed lands to beneficiaries generally and Dalits in 
particular.  The neighboring desert state of Rajasthan has similar (even slightly higher) 
parcel size location quotients.  With this in mind, we can postulate that the beneficiary-
based location quotients are more reliable (i.e., less inflated) than the acreage-based ones, 
and conclude that Gujarat has a substantially sub-par record at land redistribution, even 
judged with the built-in bias that not all states in India participate at all in such programs.  
The latter point is a double-edged sword however: the state of Gujarat should also be 
recognized for passing the legislation in the first place. 
 
Table 1.3.4-1.  Location Quotients for Gujarat’s redistribution measures sorted 
by acres, number of beneficiaries, and average parcel size. 
 
 Beneficiary Categories 
Location Coefficient Type All Recipients Scheduled Castes 
Acres Redistributed 0.53 2.08 
Number of Beneficiaries 0.13 0.28 
Average Parcel Size  4.44 5.36 
Source: Surendranagar District Land Records Office, Report of the National 
Commission for SCs/STs, 1995-1996, extracted in Thorat, Social Security for SCs in 
unorganized sector in S.M. Dev & others, Social and Economic Security in India, 
2001, p. 371 Delhi, and author’s calculations. 
 
Program Commonalities.  At the state level, the two redistribution programs share some 
commonalities.  For one, they are often both lumped together in official parlance as “land 
reforms.”  They jointly constitute the policy workhorses of the land redistribution push.  
Furthermore, both programs have been embraced, to varying degrees, by a number of 
other Indian states.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9
 For this exercise, I used the old 1991 India Census population data, as it aligned better chronologically 
with the Report of the National Commission for SCs/STs, 1995-1996. 
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The two sets of land reforms also share more mundane, technical features.  Redistributed 
parcels, for instance, must be at least 2 acres in area.  Additionally, title is conditional on 
putting the land to beneficial use.  If the Talati (local village revenue officer) notes that 
the land lies fallow for three consecutive years, the government has the right to reclaim 
the parcel and re-redistribute it.  Once title is awarded, the recipient is legally interdicted 
from selling the land for a period of 15 years, during which time the parcel is said to be 
under “new tenure.”  After the time limit has elapsed, title falls under “old tenure” rules 
and may then be sold (Jidhal 1982). 
 
Implementation of both land schemes also poses formidable obstacles to Dalits trying to 
take possession of their allotted parcels, to be elaborated in detail in Subsection 2.3.  
Much of the land is encroached upon by non-Dalits, oftentimes the original owners who 
refuse to quit it, in the case of ALCA lands.  In addition, many parcels do not obtain the 
necessary bureaucratic certifications (e.g., survey and land ledgers), are caught in 
litigation, have no access easements, or are effectively off-limits to Dalit owners due to 
implicit or explicit threats of violence, social ostracism, or economic boycott. 
 
Program Differences.  While not originally envisaged as a substitute for redistributed 
“ceiling lands,” government lands have been used as such so as not to anger powerful 
local landholders (Pradip 2007, Pers. Comm., Srivastava 2006).  This tactic has gained 
currency now in a number of other states, as well (Srivastava 2006).  It should be noted, 
however, that to the extent that government lands do substitute for ALCA lands, the 
substitution is one facilitated by the institutional dynamics of local governments operating 
in an ethnically divided society.  It should not be mistaken for a conscious choice on the 
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part of a few nefarious officials.  Indeed, as is discussed in Subsection 2.1, the selection 
process for identifying lands to be redistributed is not carried out by the same officials 
under the two programs.  Therefore, the relative paucity of ALCA lands declared under 
the ALCA may simply have shifted the burden for redistribution to the government lands 
program. 
 
The substitution is broadly considered an unfavorable one.  Many Dalits interviewed for 
this study asserted that the intensive improvement investments that government lands 
require deter them from cultivating.  A simple cross-tabulation of the 1996 survey data 
would prima facie corroborate this contention: while 7% of government lands parcels 
were reported to be uncultivable, no ALCA were reported to be so.10  The 2006 survey 
finds that only 50.0% of ALCA parcels and 60.4% of government parcels redistributed to 
Dalits are currently under cultivation.11  However, the 2006 survey did not ask about 
cultivability per se, but rather the actual act of cultivation.  The very cultivability of a 
parcel of ALCA lands exerts a draw on powerful upper-caste encroachers.12  Even if new 
farmers do manage to collect the necessary funds to bring the land under cultivation and 
eject the encroachers, though, Navsarjan fieldworkers consider the substitution of 
relatively low-quality wastelands for ceiling lands to lessen the likelihood that Dalits will 
be able to cultivate the land far into the future.  They claim lower profits from less fertile 
land causes Dalit farmers to sell off or be intimidated off their lands sooner than they 
might have with better lands.  Certainly, the 2006 survey indicates that ALCA parcels are 
                                                 
10
  This difference is significant using a Chi-Square test at the 90% confidence level.  The small 1996 
survey sample size depresses the confidence levels for data derived therefrom. 
11
 This difference is significant using a Chi-Square test at the 99% confidence level. 
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typically worth more than their government wasteland counterparts (the respective means 
were INR 250,000 and INR 185,000). 
 
While the government lands program provokes less opposition than the Agricultural Land 
Ceiling Act, it is not without controversy.  For instance, many of the government lands 
are used as village commons, and so successful transfers constitute privatization 
(Srivastava 2006).  If the intended recipients sell off their lands to wealthier upper-caste 
members, the net result will be privatization of government lands and village commons 
into the hands of the socioeconomic elite—completely counter to the stated ambitions of 
the land reform legislation. 
 
1.4. Theoretical Models for Assessing Land Redistribution Initiatives 
At this point, it is necessary to present Navsarjan’s goals and how their strategy aims to 
accomplish them.  Without such an understanding, there will be no criteria by which to 
judge Navsarjan’s progress or success.  In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to 
build a theoretical model that adequately but simply describes the caste system’s function, 
as well as the strategies that Dalit activists might reasonably choose to espouse in their 
fight against it. 
 
The following section discusses, in turn, Horowitz’s dichotomy of ranked and unranked 
societies as a theoretical lens through which I view caste conflict (1.4.1); a compressed 
                                                                                                                                                 
12
 A dummy variable indicating the type of land distributed explains by itself 27% of the variation in the 
success rate of removing upper-caste encroachments.  New owners of ALCA lands are 16.5% more likely to 
be accompanied by a stubborn encroacher (this result is significant at the 99% confidence level). 
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history of the caste system itself (1.4.2); the Dalit struggle for civil rights since Indian 
Independence (1.4.3); and Navsarjan’s place within the larger Dalit struggle (1.4.4). 
 
1.4.1. Ranked and Unranked Societies 
I structure my interpretation of Dalit activist goals in reference to Donald Horowitz’s 
concept of ranked and unranked societies.  Horowitz defines the term ‘ethnic conflict’ as 
any conflict based on ascriptive group identities, such as tribe, race, language, or caste 
(Horowitz 2000).  He contends that in a society characterized by ethnic cleavages, those 
cleavages may run “horizontally,” thereby dividing society into hierarchical 
stratifications, or “vertically,” thereby dividing society into side-by-side, stand-alone 
pillars. 
 
Ranked societies exhibit coinciding social classes and ethnicities, whereas unranked 
societies exhibit no coincidence between social class and ethnicity.  Ranked societies’ 
constituent layers are necessarily in constant friction with one another, as the upper layers 
weigh on the lower layers.  The lower layers in a stratified agrarian society will not likely 
be independently politically represented, but rather will share leaders with the strata 
above them (Gellner 1983).  When lower strata do have political leaders, Horowitz 
(2000) suggests that they must ultimately satisfy the criterion of acceptability to 
superordinate groups.  Horowitz further contends that for oppressed strata in a ranked 
society, there are a finite number of strategies for redress: 
1) displace one’s superiors, 
2) dissolve ethnic distinctions between strata completely, 
3) raise one’s position objectively, 
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4) attempt to transform the society into an unranked system. 
 
The Indian caste system is most certainly a case of a ranked society.  It represents a 
hereditary hierarchy that dictates acceptable occupations, marriage partners, public 
behavior, social standing, and home location.  It is important to distinguish between the 
religious beliefs that ground the caste system ideologically, and the social and 
institutional norms that perpetuate or challenge it in practice. 
 
In religious or ideological terms, the system is broken down by Varna (broad caste 
groupings) that include, in descending order of purity, Brahman (scholars, teachers and 
priests), Kshtriya (kings, vassals and warriors), Vaishya (merchants, traders, and 
retailers), and Sudra (agriculturalists and farmers) (National Human Rights Commission 
2004).  The Varna are said to correspond to the various parts of the body of the divinity 
Brahma, from which they are derived.  Thus, Brahmans were made from the head, 
Kshtriya from the arms, Vaishya from the torso, and Sudra from the legs. Outside of the 
Varna system, but nonetheless ranked lower than all Varna in social practice, are the 
Dalits (also known as Parjanya, Harijans, Antyaja, “untouchables,” “outcastes,” and, in 
legal terms, “Scheduled Castes” in reference to the fact that they do not belong to a Varna 
caste, but are rather included in the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution).  The term 
‘Dalits’ as used in Gujarat encompasses three major subgroups, or jati (again listed in 
descending order of purity): the Weavers (Vankar), the Leatherworkers (Chamar), and the 
Scavengers (Bhangi) (ibid.). 
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Jati, or sub-castes, play an equally, if not more, important role in the social life of Indians.  
Jati are theoretically supposed to belong to a specific Varna, though a number of jati are 
disputed in their Varna affiliations.  Furthermore, while the Varna are grouped so as to 
reflect a divine cosmic order (and are thus immutable), the status of jati may more 
directly reflect their common social and economic standing in a particular community.  
Thus, jati may be somewhat socioeconomically mobile within their particular Varna, but 
not across Varna divisions.  An example of this in the Gujarati context is provided by the 
Leatherworker, or Chamar, subcaste, whose primary occupation was taken over by the 
higher-ranking Patel sub-caste upon the mechanization of leather processing (which 
rendered the task less impure and more acceptable to higher castes).  An MIT research 
project’s survey in the village of Paliyad, Gujarat, found that discrimination against the 
Leatherworkers in all recorded dimensions (government institutions, marketplace, social 
or cultural events) had anomalously dropped to below the level of discrimination endured 
by the Weavers (Rajagopal et al. 2006).  While this phenomenon is presumably the result 
of their expulsion from leatherworking, it bears noting that Leatherworkers lost their only 
caste-condoned occupations, and may no longer come into as frequent contact with 
upper-castes if they are unemployed. 
 
Finally, the ethnic “friction” referred to above, while not religiously sanctioned, has 
embedded itself intractably in the fabric of Indian society.  This friction takes the forms of 
discrimination in government institutions, the marketplace, and sociocultural events; 
routine acts of rape and violence; and, in even more extreme cases, atrocities committed 
against Dalits (see, e.g., Sikand 2005, Devi 2000, National Campaign on Dalit Human 
Rights 1995).  It serves to perpetuate the social hierarchy by way of general degradation 
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of human dignity, social humiliation, and punitive measures against those who transgress 
caste-based norms (Fernandes 1996, Narula 1998, National Human Rights Commission 
2004, Rajagopal et al. 2006). 
 
1.4.2. The Caste System 
Klass (1980) hypothesizes that the subcontinent’s heterogeneous mix of ecological zones 
was particularly conducive to differentiated methods of food production, and resource 
extraction.  He contends that the various tribal groups can be considered proto-jatis 
(proto-castes) which, as agricultural surplus developed and increased, were gradually 
rearranged in a hierarchical system.  Tribal “closure,” or cohesiveness, may have partly 
been a countervailing response to the numerous large-scale states spanning many 
ecological zones.  If Klass is correct, then the establishment of the caste system equates to 
the “horizonalization” of what had essentially been, in Horowitz’s terminology, a 
vertically cleaved society whose pillars had been linked primarily geographically through 
trade. 
 
Omvedt (1994), advocating for a particularistic explanation of this unique phenomenon, 
suggests the highly differentiated Dravidian society, having already developed a notion of 
social purity and pollution in the time of the Indus civilization, was susceptible to the 
introduction of an exaggerated version of the purity-pollution gradient by Aryan in-
migrants.  Following the inception of the nascent caste system, Omvedt describes a 
millennial period of ascendancy for the Indo-Europeans, characterized by increasingly 
hardened caste roles.  This period was in turn followed around the middle of the first 
millennium BCE by the rise of the Magadha-Mauryan states and a period of religious 
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contention during which Buddhism challenged Brahmanical Hinduism for dominance on 
the subcontinent.  This period saw the decline of caste society in mleccha, or anti-
Brahman, territories. 
 
A Hindu counter-revolution between 600-900 CE re-launched caste society’s supremacy 
and a feudal period in which the jajmani system mediated production relations between 
landowning (primarily Kshtriya) and landless castes in pre-monetary village economies.  
Despite claims that the jajmani system rendered villages essentially self-sufficient, 
Omvedt (1994) describes this feudal system as one in which localities linked agricultural 
production across ecological niches.  The system also gave rise to some divergences 
between Varna (socio-religious status) and jati (production class), as the Kshtriya, 
socially inferior to the Brahmans, became economically dominant as landowners.  Even 
so, Omvedt (1994) points out that agricultural surplus was divided into a melvaram 
(‘upper share’) and kilvaram (‘lower share’), the former of which was frequently assigned 
to Brahmans.  Furthermore, arid regions that generated little surplus exhibited less caste 
inequality than did rich, irrigated lands generating generous surplus (ibid.). 
 
1.4.3. Today’s Dalit Struggle 
Myron Weiner (2001) notes that over a century of socio-political activism in India has 
seriously diminished the political and intellectual acceptability of publicly espousing 
caste-based ideology to preserve one’s standing.  The social reality has lagged markedly 
behind, however, especially in rural areas.  Occupational mobility is still highly tied to 
social status (Wankhede 1999).  Upon its independence, India was sold on democratic 
institutions as a means of dissipating these primordial divisions and raising the economic 
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well-being of all.  Instead, Kothari notes that this promise has largely failed: social 
oppression remains firmly rooted, acts of physical aggression against lower castes 
reinforce caste order (Kothari 1997, Narula 1999, Pradip 2006), political power has 
remained in the hands of the upper castes, and economic disparities are growing.    
Kothari chocks this up to (1) the democratic project not being faithfully carried through, 
and (2) the overwhelming complexity of the Indian case proving intractable for 
‘traditional’ democratic institutions.  As a possible counterpoint to the first proposed 
explanation, one student of democratic reform in the developing world (Snyder 2000) 
argues that the very introduction of democratic processes into an ethnically riven political 
environment may exaggerate and deepen ethnic division. 
 
Despite many Dalit calls to abolish the caste system entirely and dissolve caste 
distinctions (Horowitz’s strategy 2, above; see, e.g., Ambedkar 1944), the predominant 
mode of Dalit activism in recent years has been to leverage the cohesive identity imposed 
upon Dalits (an otherwise highly heterogeneous grouping) by the system to effectuate a 
“verticalization” of caste cleavages (Kohli 2001, Fernandes 1996).  The preservation of 
internal caste integrity would allow Dalits, on the bottom rung of society, to push 
collectively against the weight of the system above them. 
 
The fact that Dalits have forgone Horowitz’s other strategies for redress in a ranked 
society is entirely rational.  As mentioned above, many Dalits have made calls for the 
dissolution of caste boundaries.  This sentiment may have fueled the mass conversion of 
Hindus to Buddhism in 1956, led by a frustrated Dr. B. R. Ambedkar.  Ambedkar, 
nevertheless, recognized the pervasive quality of the caste system as a social phenomenon 
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that, even stripped of its religious foundations, spilled across religious boundaries to 
stratify even Muslim and Buddhist communities of the Indian subcontinent (Shivakeri 
2004).  Furthermore, the sheer intractability of a system of social categorization that has 
persisted, adapted, and shaped societal norms for three millennia has convinced many 
activists that their effort is more reasonably spent in influencing how the system operates, 
as opposed to destroying the system itself. 
 
The third strategy mentioned by Horowitz for redress of the oppressed in ranked societies 
is that of collective betterment.  That is, a caste might, through collective action, raise 
itself above other castes.  However, as previously mentioned, the Dalits as a caste group, 
are ideologically bound to remain forever subordinate to the Sudra.  This presents a 
philosophical barrier to betterment, but not necessarily a socioeconomic one.  And 
indeed, if one considers the caste system to consist of coinciding categories for karmic 
position, social status, and economic potential, it must be admitted that, to a certain extent 
(more so in urban areas than rural ones), karmic position aligns less and less neatly with 
social and economic standing.  However, the opportunities for economic betterment in a 
rural Indian village are extremely limited, as the division of labor is self-reinforcing and 
there is not the diversity of employment opportunities that one finds in a city.  Rajagopal 
et al. (2006) found very little variation in income by caste, for example, but self-reported 
financial assets were strikingly correlated to caste hierarchy.  One might attempt to 
explain rural Indian asset distribution by way of reference to a broad panoply of 
phenomena, including the institution of Dalit bonded labor, hereditary property 
ownership, and the impact on nominal upper-caste incomes of free labor in the form of 
traditional services provided by lower castes (Breman 1975). 
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1.4.4. Navsarjan’s Ideology and Goals 
Sanyal (1991) has noted that many NGOs object to income generating projects on the 
grounds that the poorest of the poor are price-takers and therefore are often 
understandably unwilling to undertake comparatively risky income generation projects 
over a back-to-the-land approach.  The Navsarjan Trust is certainly one of those NGOs.  
It has consciously eschewed “development” projects, contending that development can 
only lead to more exaggerated forms of Dalit exploitation in the absence of a radical shift 
towards egalitarianism in Indian society. 13  Consequently, Navsarjan has focused 
primarily on education (informing rural Gujarati Dalits of their legal rights around issues 
of land and physical intimidation), bureaucratic facilitation, and legal activism (filing 
suits against allegedly offending governments and individuals).  The latter activity is 
clearly geared toward bolstering Dalit solidarity.  Furthermore, Navsarjan has chosen the 
issues it organizes around with care, concentrating particularly on land redistribution, the 
elimination of so-called “manual scavenging” (the designated occupation of the lowest-
ranking Dalits, the manual removal of human excreta and dead animals from villages to 
urban peripheries), and technical vocational training for Dalits. 
 
Dalit activists have for decades demonstrated a fondness for Marxist analysis.  In the 
1920s, a resurgence in India of Marxist historical materialism portrayed jati as the 
“superstructure’s” manifestation of class.  A second wave of Marxism swept through 
                                                 
13
 Jayaram and Lanjouw’s (1998) review of 35 longitudinal studies on rural Indian poverty covering the last 
three decades of the 20th century reveals that, taking rural India as a whole, little to no progress has been 
made in breaking down the extreme stratification of economic wealth by caste.  On the contrary, they 
contend that economic development in rural India often went hand in hand with increased social 
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academic literature on India during the 1970s, this time incorporating the Althusserian 
perspective that, in special cases (and especially in pre-industrial societies), the 
superstructure may dictate the development of the base (Omvedt 1994).  The interest for 
Dalit activists is tripartite: it draws attention to the plight of the oppressed classes (or 
castes); it provides a mechanism for societal change over time; and it postulates a 
necessarily freer world in the future while casting the proletariat (or Dalits) as the 
righteous forerunners of the brave new world order. 
 
The second point, that of Marxism’s enabling societal change over time, is an especially 
critical factor for widespread Dalit and popular support.  Ernest Gellner has argued that 
pre-industrial, ‘agro-literate’ societies tend to reinforce horizontal stratifications in an 
attempt to make them appear to be a ‘natural,’ immutable order: 
Thanks to the relative stability of agro-literate societies, sharp separations of the 
population into estates or castes or millets can be established and maintained without 
creating intolerable frictions.  On the contrary, by externalizing, making absolute and 
underwriting inequalities, it fortifies them and makes them palatable by endowing them 
with the aura of inevitability, permanence and naturalness.  That which is inscribed into 
the nature of things and is perennial is consequently not personally, individually 
offensive, nor psychically intolerable. (Gellner 1983, 11) 
On a similar note, Rousseau once noted that “[t]he nature of things does not madden us, 
only ill will does.”  (quoted in Berlin 1969, 123)  If the causes of social or economic 
oppression appeared natural outgrowths of an accepted cosmic order, it was unlikely that 
Dalits would chafe at what activists claimed were shackles.  Early Indian caste activists 
balked at just this sort of caste ‘permanence and naturalness,’ and found intellectual 
ammunition in Marxist ideology to counter it.  Ambedkar, a Dalit barrister and activist 
who eventually presided over the framing committee for the Indian constitution, was 
                                                                                                                                                 
stratification.  They also note that the long-term poor tend to come from the lower castes dependent on 
agricultural incomes. 
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particularly keen.  In his “Annihilation of Caste” address (1944), Ambedkar stressed that 
(1) cultural values can be morally judged, (2) social heritage should be conserved only 
when it is helpful, (3) we must structure our society around the present and not the past, 
and, importantly, (4) nothing in this world or in our society—caste included—is fixed or 
eternal. 
 
Navsarjan’s focus on land redistribution reflects an attenuated Marxism inherited from 
early Dalit activists.  Navsarjan is an avowedly “Ambedkarist” organization: his portrait 
graces the organization’s website, hangs in the office of the director, and is reproduced 
(along with the likenesses of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.) on a mural at 
Navsarjan’s vocational training center, the Dalit Shakti Kendra (or Dalit Power Center) in 
Sanand, Gujarat14.   Importantly for the purposes of this study, Ambedkar (in a parallel 
with the Physiocrat school of economics) accepted lands as the source of socioeconomic 
exploitation (Omvedt 1994).  However, counter to Marx, he critically rejected the 
conflation of politics and economics, and therefore insisted that political conflict be seen 
as separate from economic development.  Ambedkar’s point of departure from Marx is 
attested to today by Navsarjan’s persistent ambivalence around economic development 
projects, as well as their conviction that political activism can directly affect underlying 
economic trends. 
 
Navsarjan’s focus on land redistribution can been seen as an attempt at verticalizing 
horizontal ethnic cleavages.  A horizontal stratum is interdependent with all other strata, 
                                                 
14
 “Ambedkarism” is a typical ideological hallmark of many Dalit activist groups.  See, e.g., Sikand 2005, 
on Gujarat’s Council for Social Justice. 
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and this is no less the case with the Bhangis (a sub-stratum of the Dalits), who constitute 
a traditionally landless community dependent upon upper-caste handouts of leftover food 
for their sustenance.  By redistributing land, Navsarjan hopes to create a cohesive, self-
sufficient community—a Horowitzian stand-alone pillar.  Horowitz’s conceptual 
framework helps us to make sense of the other activities on which Navsarjan has chosen 
to focus, as well.  In particular, Navsarjan’s vocational training program, which might 
otherwise be viewed as too close to an “income generation” project, can now be seen for 
a attempt to shake up the coincidence between ethnicity (caste) and socioeconomic status. 
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2. LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
 
Various levels of the Indian government jointly carry out the land reforms.  Governmental 
subdivisions at the sub-state levels form a Weberian vertical hierarchy of three ascending 
tiers: village, taluka, and district.  I contend that information and influence do not simply 
flow down from top to bottom, but also percolate up from the ground level—that the 
hierarchy is, in effect, contested ground.  In the following subsections, I examine in turn: 
the official responsibilities of government offices in the land reforms (Subsection 2.1), 
how local government offices actually implement the land reform legislation (Subsection 
2.2), the differential treatment of ALCA and government wastelands in this process 
(Subsection 2.3), and the social outcomes of these efforts at the household level 
(Subsection 2.4).  In this way, the various responsibilities often vaguely attributed to 
“government” in vituperative newspaper exposés (see, e.g., Parimal 2005, The Hindu 
Online 2002, Uday 1997) can be more specifically assigned to bureaucratic organs that 
individually exercise discretion in their application of the law.  Navsarjan (2000a) 
reported in 2000 that only around one-third of those lands officially redistributed on paper 
(or roughly 50,000 of 150,000 acres—the latter already a fractional subset of the original 
estimates of lands subject to the legislation) were in fact in the possession of the intended 
recipients.  This low success rate a priori suggests two possible explanations: (1) the 
government bureaucracy is failing Dalit applicants in the implementation stages, or (2) 
social pressures exerted on the ground by upper-caste members prevent Dalits from 
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claiming their rights.  In fact, the two are not independent of one another.  I argue below 
that the hierarchy of local governments is an institutional framework in which the 
interests of large landholders contest Dalit land claims and attempt to undermine the 
intended effects of progressive legislation. 
 
2.1. Government Officials & Their Responsibilities 
The responsibilities of the various officials and offices are given in Table 2.1-1, and are 
discussed at some length in below.  Officials in the first category (village/panchayat level) 
are elected, while officials in the latter two categories (taluka and district levels) are 
appointed.  At the taluka level, the state government appoints local politicians and 
technocrats, while at the district level, the central government appoints a mix of local and 
out-of-state bureaucrats.  Thus, the chain of command would suggest a gradient of 
involvement in, and alignment with, local interests. 
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Table 2.1-1.  Government officials key to the implementation of land redistribution legislation. 
 
Level Official/Office Function 
District Collector - Aggregates revenue and taxes collected at the taluka 
level 
- Oversees planning process and implementation of land 
reforms 
District Inpector of 
Land Records 
- Precisely surveys lands at the behest of the Mamlatdar’s 
office 
3. District 
Deputy Collector - Decides which government lands to distribute 
- Conducts regular surveys of potential lands in 
cooperation with the Agriculture Department 
Block Magistrate 
(Mamlatdar) 
- Gives public notice of all available lands 
- Capable of identifying available Ceiling lands 
- Technically capable of setting the land ceiling 
Revenue Circle 
Officer 
- Revenue and tax collection at the taluka level 
Surveyor - Measures out the metes and bounds of allotted acreages 
(does not use precise instruments) 
2. Taluka 
Government Lands 
Committee 
- Decides which applicants will receive government lands 
according to a prioritization hierarchy 
1. Village/ 
Panchayat 
Talati - Identifies lands in excess of the land ceiling 
- Collects property tax (“land revenue”) 
- Maintains village 7-12 forms, which detail to what use 
redistributed lands have been put 
Source: the author. 
 
 
2.1.1. District Officials 
Officials called District Collectors supervise the implementation of land redistribution at 
the district level in Gujarat.  District Collectors are charged with revenue and tax 
collection; overseeing the planning process and the implementation of land reforms 
(including the surveying of affected plots when necessary); and the quasi-judicial 
functions associated with the discretion to carry out the above.  Most relevant to this 
study, the District Collector’s office oversees several Deputy Collectors in selecting and 
certifying which government wastelands will be distributed to the public.  All distributed 
lands must lend themselves to agriculture, and so the Deputy Collector’s office conducts 
regular surveys in cooperation with the Agriculture Department to determine which 
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parcels are cultivatable.  Once the lands have been certified cultivable, the Collector’s 
office places them on a list of available lands, and conveys this list to a taluka-level 
committee discussed below for consideration of redistribution applicants.  Deputy 
Collectors are often referred to as operating at the “sub-district” level, but for the sake of 
convenience, I have amalgamated the two here. 
 
Some Navsarjan staff consider Deputy Collectors often to share interests with local elites, 
as one-third are “homegrown” and most often come themselves from higher castes 
(Macwan 2007, Pers. Comm..).  Some interviewees have postulated political 
considerations and pressures that bear on the decisions that District Collectors take.  For 
instance, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the principal national opposition to 
the majority Congress Party, is especially strong in Gujarat.  Given the BJP’s support for 
such ideologically charged issues as Hindutva (conservative Hindu nationalism) and 
privatization, some speculate that the BJP has a hand in land redistribution for a few 
reasons.  Most notably, they may advocate for the redistribution of public wastelands as 
an alternative to the redistribution of private agricultural lands under the Land Ceiling 
Act, which is anathema to their party philosophy. 
 
Political bias at the district level is nonetheless unlikely, and difficult to prove, in any 
event.  The new District Collector for Surendranagar District (a social liberal and, 
unusually, a woman) specifically noted the difficulty in transforming progressive District-
level policy decisions into results on the ground.  She expressed her sincere wish to be 
able to do more for minorities oppressed by powerful landholders during her tenure as 
District Collector—refreshing candor after an interview with the Deputy Collector of the 
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southern sub-district of Surendranagar, who systematically denied that zamindars, or even 
large landholders, existed after the ALCA reforms.  (While statutorily abolished in 1952, 
Chakravarti [2004] contends that the move did not significantly weaken the traditional 
social base of land control.)  Furthermore, the general perception among the vast majority 
of Dalit farmers interviewed for this study is that district-level officials are rarely corrupt 
and generally perform their job functions “objectively.” 
 
More general considerations also work against the political bias theory.  The application 
procedure to become a District Collector is extremely competitive, the position highly 
respected and the remuneration decent—at around INR 20,000, or around USD 450, 
District Collectors earn salaries about five times as great as the average Navsarjan Land 
Redistribution Programme fieldworker (Majumdar 2006).  District Collectors are 
recruited from two different agencies according to a formula.  Two-thirds are recruited 
from within the Weberian and highly esteemed Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 
which is the direct organizational descendent of the illustrious Indian Civil Service begun 
under British rule.  At IAS, would-be public administrators undergo specialized 
bureaucratic training and testing before being appointed to their respective posts by 
presidential fiat.  One-third of District Collectors is recruited from within the state 
counterpart agency, the Gujarat Administrative Service (GAS).  Before being posted to 
the District Collector position, though, these candidates must pass the standard IAS 
examinations and be promoted into IAS.  The District Collector is intended to be 
politically and ideologically neutral, and has historically been subject to reassignment to 
any district in the federal government in the case that IAS deems it necessary to insulate 
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him or her from local politics or, potentially, to placate district voters unhappy with the 
current Collector. 
 
All the above considerations make corruption less likely.  Moreover, it would be at best a 
monumental task, and, more realistically, simply impossible to attempt to uncover all the 
conceivable quid pro quos, deals, and intimated demands that may have gone into shaping 
District Collectors’ decisions.  For these reasons, it is most reasonable for a study of this 
scope to take the decisions of District Collectors at face value, and to treat them as the 
faithful reflections of State policy interfacing with the demographic influences in their 
local district. 
 
The District Inspector of Land Records, despite the district-level position, is a marginal 
player in the land redistribution process.  When called upon by a specific taluka 
Mamlatdar, the office will survey lands that have been allotted for redistribution, whether 
under the Land Ceiling Act or the government wasteland program.  The surveys it 
performs are more precise than those of the surveyor from the local Mamlatdar’s office.  
This office does not, however, keep centralized records of all lands redistributed as of 
now.  These records are to be found only in the various Talati offices of local panchayats. 
 
 
2.1.2. Taluka-Level Officials 
The principal official concerned with land redistribution at the taluka-level is the 
Mamlatdar, or Taluka Block Magistrate.  He chiefly deals with lands falling under the 
ALCA, and is, with the advent of computerized offices, capable of identifying 
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landholdings in excess of the land ceiling (though this task customarily falls to the 
Talati).  He is charged with giving public notice of all available lands, whether they be 
ceiling lands or government wastelands.  The bulk of the ALCA cases were sorted out by 
the end of the 1980s, with two major pushes coming in 1969 and 1976.  Today, most of 
the remaining cases are those that were contested by the original owners, and are still 
bogged down in the courts.  In urban areas, applications are made directly to the District 
Collector. 
 
Interestingly, the Mamlatdar’s office is also technically empowered to set the land ceiling 
for that particular taluka.  In one focus group discussion with officials of Sayla taluka, 
Surendranagar district (Mamlatdar, Circle Revenue Officer, Sayla Talati) and Navsarjan 
fieldworkers, certain Navsarjan staff pressed the Mamlatdar to use this authority to lower 
the land ceiling for those lands capable of supporting higher-value crops.  These 
fieldworkers suggested 25 acres for lands that can support rice all year, and 10 acres for 
those that can support sugar cane.  Furthermore, they contend that this capacity should in 
particular be exercised in the near future as water diverted from the Narmada River via 
the infamous Narmada Canal drastically increases the value of nearby parcels.  In 
practice, however, Mamlatdars defer to the benchmark set by the district, and presumably 
avoid the blame for setting unpopular land ceilings.  When asked about this point, the 
Surendranagar District Collector stated simply that her office sets the threshold. 
 
The Revenue Circle Officer is responsible for revenue collection on lands within his 
taluka.  The surveyor measures out the metes and bounds of a parcel once the 
Government Lands Committee has designated a recipient. 
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A Government Lands Committee convenes at the taluka level to consider the applications 
for available government lands published by the Mamlatdar.  In the case of government 
lands, after publication of land availability, applicants prepare a statement that varies 
across districts to be submitted before the deadline.  The Committee is convened by the 
District Collector, and has representatives from local special interest and minority groups 
(e.g., an SC, an ST, and an ex-serviceman); one representative of the panchayat, or 
village, government; and (according to the Surendranagar District Collector) occasional 
social workers and concerned citizens.  The applicants are assessed based first upon 
location (with preference for those residing within 8 kilometers of the land), second on a 
prioritized list of preferred demographic groups, and third upon merit.  The prioritization 
hierarchy for groups during the application process is as follows: 
1) landless 
2) scheduled tribes (STs) 
3) scheduled castes (SCs) 
4) agricultural cooperatives15 
5) other backward castes (OBCs) 
6) ex-servicemen 
                                                 
15
 Navsarjan fieldworkers believe that agricultural cooperatives generally do more harm than good, and that 
they should not receive the favor they do in the selection process.  Fieldworkers are able to relate a number 
of stories of agricultural cooperatives that were formed by wealthy Dalits for the express purpose of 
becoming eligible for government agricultural subsidies and farm equipment grants targeted at such groups.  
Once these latter are obtained, the cooperative fails, with the founders keeping the equipment and the 
money, and the rest of the group left further impoverished.  A notable exception to this pattern occurs in 
Paccham, where a cooperative of 16 households has adopted communal management.  This rare successful 
model operates on the basis of equity ownership: to the extent that a member invests in the cooperative, thus 
boosting his equity share, he receiving a proportionally larger share of the produce. 
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Combinations of these characteristics boost an applicant’s likelihood for receiving land.  
For instance, a cooperative society of local, landless STs with previous agricultural 
experience, say as agricultural laborers, would carry great weight. 
 
 
2.1.3. Village-Level Officials 
The Talati is the official closest to the ground, insofar as he comes in routine contact with 
land recipients and former large landholders.  It is for this reason, and because he does not 
require the cooperation of any other official to make key decisions, that Navsarjan 
fieldworkers emphatically state that the Talati is the most corruptible of local politicians.  
He is expected to use his personal discretion to implement many of the land reforms 
discussed above, including the primary identification of landholdings that exceed the 54 
acre land ceiling threshold.  He also assists the taluka Revenue Circle Officer and 
Surveyor in surveying the metes and bounds of allotted parcels.  The Talati also collects 
the local property tax (or “land revenue”) based on a khatavahi, or land ledger that he 
conveys to land recipients and in which they in turn record their agricultural produce.  
Banks often make loans to farmers based on the data recorded in their khatavahis, making 
this a critical document attesting to one’s asset-base and financial viability.  In fact, 
Navsarjan fieldworkers assert that taking out agricultural loans from banks by 
collateralizing one’s property can check upper-caste encroachment on the land, because 
bank officers (who now have a legal interest in the property via a lien) regularly audit the 
land.  Finally, the Talati maintains the Village 7-12 forms from the information culled 
from khatavahis.  The latter record the use government land has been put to following its 
allotment.  If, after three years, the land has not been “improved” in any way for 
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agricultural use, it theoretically reverts back to the government, which re-publishes its 
availability. 
 
 
2.1.4. The Bureaucratic System at Work 
So what does the redistribution process look like from start to finish?  The selection 
process will differ depending on whether lands are being distributed under the ALCA or 
the Government Lands Programme.  The steps of both selection processes are laid out in 
Table 2.1.4-1, while the steps of the implementation process are enumerated in Table 
2.1.4-2.  Steps C1-C4 are illustrated in Figure B-1; G1-G4 in Figure B-2; I1-I6 in Figure 
B-3 (all found in APPENDIX B).  As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, this study largely 
ignores the selection process for redistributed lands for want of reliable information, and 
instead concentrates on the implementation process.  It is worth noting, however, that 
while the Government Lands Programme selection process involves cooperation 
(between the Deputy Collector’s office and the Agriculture Department, and again in 
between the members of the Government Lands Committee) and the regular input of 
higher levels of government, the ALCA selection process involves low-level bureaucrats 
operating singly. 
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Table 2.1.4-1. Selection processes for land recipients under the ALCA (designated C) and Government Lands 
Programme (designated G). 
Step Agricultural Land Ceiling Act Step Government Lands Programme 
C1 The Talati (or Mamlatdar) identifies a parcel as 
exceeding the 54-acre ceiling set for a single 
owner, and the Mamlatdar notifies the District 
Collector.  The land is confiscated and 
compensation paid. 
G1 The Deputy Collector and the Agriculture 
Department survey government lands and 
identify  cultivable parcels. 
C2 The District Collector authorizes land 
redistribution and compensation for the original 
landholder. 
G2 The Mamlatdar publicizes the land’s 
availability in the local newspaper or other 
media outlet. 
C3 The Mamlatdar publicizes the land’s 
availability in the local newspaper or other 
media outlet. 
G3 Hopefuls submit their applications to the 
Government Lands Committee office. 
C4 Hopefuls submit their applications directly to 
the Mamlatdar’s office, which assesses the 
applications itself. 
G4 The Mamlatdar’s representative brings the 
applications to the Government Lands 
Committee for evaluation, and conveys the 
results of the deliberation back to the taluka 
headquarters. 
Source: the author. 
 
Table 2.1.4-2.  The process of implementing land reforms (designated I) is shared by both the ALCA 
and the Government Lands Programme. 
I1 Mamlatdar informs the recipients of land awarded to them, as well as its approximate location. 
I2 Recipient confirms to the Mamlatdar his intention to cultivate the land. 
I3 The Revenue Circle Officer, Surveyor and Talati convene at the parcel to mark the bounds and 
notify the successful applicant(s) of the exact measurements taken.16 
I4 The Talati conveys the khatavahi, or land ledger, to the land recipients. 
I5 Recipients take possession and begin to pay land revenue to the Circle Revenue Officer. 
I6 In the case of a boundary dispute or need of more precise clarification on metes and bounds, the 
Mamlatdar requests the office of the District Inspector of Land Records to send a more highly 
trained surveyor. 
Source: the author. 
 
2.2. A Simplified Analysis of Government’s Impact on Redistribution 
This subsection examines via regression analysis the contention that the government 
hierarchy is a contested terrain, with powerful local interests at the ground level pushing 
upward through nested local governments against central redistributive legislation.  From 
this idea flow a couple of testable hypotheses: 
                                                 
16
 This is a controversial moment, and can draw a hostile crowd.  Therefore, the Mamlatdar’s office will 
sometimes bring along a police escort to see that possession can be handed over peacefully.  Navsarjan 
employees contend that police escorts are not provided nearly often enough. 
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1. The explanatory power of the statistical models will fall as they attempt to analyze 
consecutively higher levels of government, because powerful community interests 
and ground-level factors will be felt less intensely; and (a corollary) 
2. The influence of the local upper-caste community will be felt more strongly in 
governments that are closer, both geographically and institutionally, to the locality 
in question, and farther from the immediately superior local government 
headquarters.  This hypothesis reflects the transaction costs involved in 
government monitoring and communication in rural Gujarat. 
 
Forgetting for a moment the chronological complexity of the bureaucratic interactions 
described in Section 2.1, I now attempt to simplify the layers of policy implementation 
drastically for the sake of analytic convenience. Table 2.2-2 categorizes many of the most 
important system “breakdowns” by level of government, from Level 0 (ground level) to 
Level 1 (village level) to Level 2 (taluka level).  The district level is not considered here 
because it is primarily involved in the assessment and selection processes, and because it 
falls outside this study’s scope to make inter-district comparisons.  In the analysis of the 
2006 survey data, each potential breakdown is treated as a dummy variable (1 or 0, 
respectively signifying “breakdown” or “no breakdown”).  Certain variables are treated as 
continuous dummy variables (i.e., they range from 0 to 1, where 1 means the breakdown 
occurred totally, 0 signifies that no breakdown occurred at all, and a fractional amount 
indicates to what extent the breakdown occurred).  These dummy variables are then 
aggregated and attributed to the corresponding level of government for each landowner 
interviewed.  Table 2.2-1 lists the control variables available and their sources. 
 61
Table 2.2-1.  Levels of Sub-District Government and Their Potential for Implementation Breakdown.  
Continuous dummy variables are marked with an asterisk (*).  Variables of questionable categorical 
fit are in parentheses. 
 
Government Level Breakdown 
2: Taluka - The survey was not performed*  
- Title was not conveyed 
- (An easement was never established) 
1: Village/Panchayat - Khatavahi, or land ledger, was not conveyed 
- Khatavahi was not amended to reflect new land allotment 
- An encroachment exists on paper* 
- (An easement was never established) 
0: Ground - A hostile incident while taking possession 
- An encroachment exists in reality* 
Source: the author. 
 
 
Table 2.2-2.  Control variables and their sources. 
 
Source Control Variables 
2006 Survey - Land type (ALCA versus government lands) 
- Acres of parcel in question 
- Value per acre of parcel in question 
GIS (created by author17) - Distance of the village from the taluka headquarters 
- Distance of the village from the district headquarters 
- Distance of the taluka headquarters from the district headquarters 
State Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) survey 
- Percentage of the village population below acute poverty line 
(Government index 1-5) 
- Percentage of the village population below severe poverty line 
(Government index 1-10) 
- Percentage of the village population below severe moderate poverty 
line (Government index 1-15) 
- Percentage of the village population below poverty line 
(Government index 1-20) 
Census of India 2001 - Total population of the village 
- Literacy rate 
- Scheduled Castes as a percentage of village population 
- Main agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
- Marginal agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
- Working population generally as a percentage of village population 
Source: the author. 
 
Government-level breakdowns are defined as failures of the government bureaucracy to 
fulfill the functions of its intended and mandated role in the redistribution process.  
Breakdowns on the ground level, by contrast, consist of social and community pressures 
that are actively brought to bear for the purpose of discouraging Dalit land possession.  I 
                                                 
17
 Considering the extreme unreliability of GIS data for Gujarat, the distances are not measured using 
network analysis of the road system, but rather simply “as the crow flies.” 
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argue that violence “on the ground” emerges under institutional conditions favorable to 
the persistence of horizontal socioeconomic stratification and coincidence of social and 
economic status.  A certain positive circular reinforcement is at work: institutions may 
allow for continued de facto “patrimonialism,” and in turn powerful landlords benefiting 
from the social arrangement push for their brand of local government. 18  The trick, then, 
is to understand how the cycle can be reversed. 
 
The first type of ground-level breakdown occurs if hostility erupts at the scene of a survey 
where the Circle Revenue Officer, Talati, and taluka Surveyor arrive to mete out the land.  
This is especially so with ALCA cases, where there is almost always a de facto upper 
caste “encroacher” (the original owner)—12.3% of ALCA land recipients reported some 
form of aggression upon taking possession of their lands, versus only 3.6% of 
government lands recipients19.  In the latter case, government lands may have already 
been under cultivation by others—sometimes (but not always) upper-caste members.  For 
instance, in Kanpur village, Dalits reported that the village Darbars (members of the 
Kshtriya caste) allowed other forward caste members to cultivate local government lands, 
but forbade local Dalits doing likewise.  By contrast, in Shiyen village, located in a region 
with a large tribal population, Dalit recipients of a 100-acre pre-independence land 
concession had been effectively bullied off of 50 acres by the more numerous indigenous 
farmers.  The second type of ground-level breakdown occurs when a hostile encroacher 
                                                 
18
 Sharuna (1998) argues that the transition from feudalism, as embodied in the Zamindari system, to what 
he terms the “patrimonialism” that characterized post-independence land relations consisted of a shift from 
the supremacy of those skilled in war to those who require, and take advantage of, the legal system and 
government officials to legitimize their power.  Thus, while the Zamindari system was a system of 
production in which Zamindars depended upon the Marxian appropriation of a peasant surplus, 
patrimonialism can be seen in a more Weberian tradition as a social system, too. 
19
 This difference is significant with a Chi-Square test at the 99% level. 
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prevents the Dalit title recipient from making beneficial use of his/her land.  The 
encroachers were often the owners or de facto cultivators of the land prior to 
redistribution. 
 
2.2.1. General Trends in Regression Results for Breakdown Predictors 
The statistical models predicting breakdowns prove more powerful at lower levels of 
policy implementation.  They are able to account for around 39% of the variation in 
breakdowns arising at the ground levels, fall to 34% at the village level, and fall again to 
11-19% explanatory power at the taluka level.  This trend suggests that local conditions 
and local interests have less influence on policy implementation efforts that occur at 
progressively higher levels of government.  It should be noted, however, that a few 
independent variables with village-specific characteristics (e.g., the Below Poverty Line 
data) might naturally be expected to produce this trend, since they would apply directly to 
ground- and village-level phenomena, but only constitutively to higher-order phenomena. 
 
2.2.2. Ground-Level Breakdowns 
Village Government’s Role.  The predictors of ground-level breakdowns are listed in 
descending order of influence in Table 2.2.2-1 (see APPENDIX C, Tables C-1and Tables 
C-2 for more complete statistical results).  Most strikingly, village-level governments that 
present many obstacles for Dalits during the redistribution process are strongly indicative 
of a fraught environment on the ground, as well.  Ceteris paribus, for every ten obstacles 
that a village-level government presents, another 4.5 obstacles are generated at the ground 
level.  In the course of the interviews for this study the most oft-cited explanation for this 
synergistic phenomenon is the fact that strong village elites often control the local 
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government, aligning political interests with those of large landholders and creating a 
favorable environment for further Dalit oppression on the ground. 
 
In Devaliya village, Sayla taluka, for example, the powerful Darbar “village king” 
successfully does just that.  He retains stoutly hierarchical views of caste’s role in society, 
and has strong connections to the local government.  Though he speaks protectively and 
patronizingly of local Dalits, he bemoans the partial devolution of economic power to 
lower castes.  During the interview he gave for this study, he pointed out a member of the 
Patel jati who was listening in and, within easy earshot, explained that in his 
grandfather’s time, that Patel blithely smoking a bidi in front of him would not even have 
been allowed to wear shoes in his presence.  When asked to describe his relationship with 
the talati, the “village king” offered to call him and order him to attend our interview.  He 
added that the talati would come even at midnight if he called, and that he (the Darbar 
landholder) retains enough social standing to decide who will be sarpanch (village 
mayor).  Although the latter position is technically elected, it is not unusual in small 
villages for the descendents of zamindars to tell villagers for whom they should vote.  
Given the cyclic nature of the relations between village government and caste relations in 
village social life, I also performed the analysis using two-stage least-squares analysis, but 
obtained nearly identical results to those reported in Table 2.2.2-1 (see APPENDIX C, 
Tables C-2).  
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Table 2.2.2-1.  Determinants of breakdowns in redistribution implementation at the ground level in 
decreasing order of importance. 
 
Rank Standardized 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable 
1 0.448*** Government Breakdowns at the Village Level 
2 -0.310*** Distance of the village from the taluka headquarters 
3 0.306*** Percentage of the village population below poverty line (government index 1-20) 
4 0.266*** Working population generally as a percentage of village population 
5 0.244*** Marginal agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
6 -0.219*** Land type (ALCA versus government lands) 
7 0.180*** Distance of the taluka headquarters from the district headquarters 
8 0.129* Value per acre of parcel in question 
9 0.126* Main agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
Explanatory power = 39%; *** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence 
level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey data, author’s calculations. 
 
Geographic Distance.  The impact of geographic distance on administration plays a key 
role in establishing the administrative hierarchy as a contested terrain (see for a map of 
Surendranagar district and its villages).  On the one hand, the greater the distance between 
the local taluka headquarters and district headquarters (the latter being Surendranagar 
City in this case), the likelier it is that the redistribution process will stall for social 
reasons.  Navsarjan fieldworkers explain this correlation by saying that long travel times 
lead to reduced district-level supervision, which in turn breeds corruption at taluka 
headquarters.  Consequently, fieldworkers contend that taluka magistrates are less likely 
to use scarce resources to pay for police escorts during surveys and easement allotments 
(a not-infrequent requirement to which the Sayla mamlatdar admits), and local mobs may 
more easily influence the survey procedure or physically prevent the Dalit beneficiary 
from taking possession. 
 
On the other hand, greater distances between the village and taluka headquarters generally 
result in an even larger decrease in breakdowns occurring on the ground.  Assessing the 
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situation under the paradigm of top-down administration, this finding would appear 
counter-intuitive.  In parallel with the above finding, shouldn’t one expect to find that as 
the distance grows, it becomes more difficult for taluka officials to ensure that 
redistribution measures are carried out on the ground?  In fact, this finding may be 
evidence for the view that influence in the administrative structure runs bi-directionally.  
After all, the farther away the taluka headquarters, the less pressure can be brought to bear 
on taluka officials by large landholders.  The taluka officials interviewed for this study 
admitted to being under constant pressure to balance the interests of “the community.”  
One mamlatdar said that he tried to limit his exposure to undue pressure—i.e., bribes, 
threats, and such—by developing two mutually exclusive identities: one a government 
bureaucrat, one a community-member.  By contrast, the Deputy Collector interviewed, 
even further removed from local interests, took offense at any implication that he might 
be subject to social pressures that would compromise his neutrality. 
 
Furthermore, Dalits in villages in closer proximity to the taluka headquarters may also be, 
by definition, in closer proximity to the closest agricultural market.  This fact would 
increase Dalit access to markets, thereby reducing their dependence on large-scale 
farmers with storage capacity.  This alternative explanation would suggest an economic 
backing to increased political power.  However, this study did not obtain information on 
specific market towns frequented by Dalit farmers, and thus was unequipped to hold this 
variable constant. 
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Figure 2.2.2-1. Map of Surendranagar district depicting villages, taluka headquarters, and district 
headquarters. 
 
Poverty.  Large population percentages below the poverty line is also a strong, reliable 
predictor of ground-level breakdowns.  One possible reason is that Dalits tend to be 
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poorer than upper-castes (Rajagopal et al. 2006), and the poverty-stricken are less likely 
to have the means necessary to cultivate an agricultural parcel successfully and 
sustainably.  Sayla Taluka officials reported that the three most daunting challenges 
facing a prospective Dalit farmer are: 
• improvement costs (especially with government lands that require extensive 
leveling, fertilization, etc.); 
• variations in rainfall, as Gujarat is a desert state and much of the land is dry-
farmed rather than irrigated; and 
• market prices, which tend to be low.  Not only do small farmers often compete 
with subsidized, industrial-scale operations, but they also have little to no storage 
capacity for their produce, and equally little savings.  Since these small farmers 
are inherently price-takers on the market, and since they are unable to wait out 
price troughs, they are likely to sell low to larger farmers with greater storage 
capacity and savings. 
All three of these factors make Dalits particularly vulnerable from an economic point of 
view, especially those on government lands.  This is born out by the proportion of land 
recipients who have since sold their land: 9.2% amongst government lands recipients, as 
opposed to 2.1% amongst ALCA recipients.  Another conceivable, but less convincing, 
explanation is that, to the extent upper-caste members find themselves below the poverty 
line, they may be more desperate to reclaim their land and have fewer recourses to official 
channels than their wealthier counterparts. 
 
Labor Market.  Three of the eight significant predictors of ground-level breakdowns had 
to do with the “thickness” of the local labor market.  Indeed, when added together, these 
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factors outweigh any other single factor.  The factors include the village proportion of 
marginal agricultural laborers, that of the labor force in general, and that of main 
agricultural laborers.  All three are positively correlated to breakdowns on the ground, 
meaning that thicker labor markets generate more social tension around land 
redistribution than do thin ones.  Not surprisingly, the strongest influence of the three 
labor variables is that of the proportion of marginal agricultural laborers.  Most of the 
Dalits interviewed for this study had been, prior to land redistribution measures, migrant 
(and therefore marginal) agricultural laborers.20  Most continued to migrate despite the 
reforms (around 53%), though some survey respondents falling into this category reported 
that ownership of a small landholding effectively reduced the number of months during 
which they migrated.  Many more have not stopped migrating at all.21 
 
Migrant laborers have very little power, economic or otherwise, within their 
communities.  Without official residency, they may not vote for local officials or send 
their children to public schools.  It is also not in migrants’ best interests to invest heavily 
in long-term assets such as property, and most live in “katcha,” or thatch/multi-media 
houses.  Ranging from in their contribution to total population across the sampled 
villages from negligible to almost 20%, the presence of migrant laborers generally 
depresses the going wage for agricultural labor (Navsarjan 2000b).  This is partly due to 
the fact that migrants do not have recourse to local officials who might enforce minimum 
wage laws.  With low incomes and little collateral, they are also subject to ruinous 
                                                 
20
 69.3% of survey respondents had previously been employed as agricultural laborers. 
21
 Around 6.4% of survey respondents formerly employed as agricultural laborers reported reduced, but not 
eliminated, periods of migration.  This is against the much more promising figure of 47.0% of agricultural 
laborers who stopped migrating entirely, leaving 46.6% who have not stopped or reduced their seasonal 
 70
interest rates on loans, sometimes over 200% yearly interest (ibid.).  The period of 
indebtedness may stretch out for years, sometimes into subsequent generations.  
Navsarjan (ibid.) has documented bonded laborers constituting up to 8% of the Dalit 
agricultural labor pool in selected Gujarati villages.  It is indeed easy to comprehend 
Navsarjan’s Marxian view that Dalit agricultural laborers, and especially migrants, 
constitute an oppressed class—a sort of pre-Industrial Reserve Army.22 
 
In view of this background, one can hypothesize a number of ways that agricultural 
laborers might indirectly contribute to the erection of redistribution obstacles on the 
ground.  For one, the depressed wages they cause might lessen land recipients’ ability to 
make necessary improvements to their land.  In the longer run, the presence of a cheap 
agricultural labor force may enable the persistence through time of “outmoded” 
socioeconomic arrangements.  A corollary hypothesis would be that the absence of cheap 
labor makes it less feasible for absentee landlords profitably to farm their holdings.  
Finally, to the extent that Dalit migrant laborers find themselves the recipients of 
redistributed lands, they may exhibit handicaps above and beyond those of other Dalits, 
such as debt carried over from their former existence, and a lack of “social capital” or 
networks. 
 
Land Type.  Recipients of government land have, other considerations equal, 22% fewer 
ground-level obstacles to contend with than do recipients of ALCA lands.  Presumably, 
                                                                                                                                                 
migrations.  These numbers significantly favor ALCA recipients over government lands recipients (see 
Appendix C). 
22
 With migrant labor’s effects on local wages in mind, consider for instance the following quote from 
Capital: 
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this is because, in addition to social taboos against Dalit land ownership, ALCA land 
recipients have to contend with former landowners seeking to retain control over their 
former properties.  Section 2.3 delves more deeply into the differences between these two 
types of lands. 
 
Land Value.  Predictably, the higher the value of the parcel in question, the more likely 
obstacles to Dalit cultivation will arise in the community.  This simple fact reflects the 
great desirability of fertile lands in a semi-arid landscape.  The government wastelands 
awarded to a Dalit farmer in Vandavar village serve as the subject of a natural 
experiment, conveniently separating the issue of land use from soil quality.  Members of 
the upper-caste Patel community do not vie for control over the land itself, as it forms the 
bed of a seasonal lake behind a reservoir dam, and is thus only tillable for six months of 
the year.   Instead, the Patels choose to cart off the rich alluvial topsoil from the land as 
the lake waters recede at the beginning of winter. 
 
2.2.3. Village-Level Breakdowns 
As when assessing breakdowns at the ground level, breakdowns at the village level (see 
Table 2.2.3-1, and APPENDIX C, Tables C-3) are most strongly encouraged by 
breakdowns one level up—at the taluka level.   Like before, the presence of poverty also 
correlates positively with breakdowns.  Interestingly, though, a negative coefficient is 
associated with a more extreme category of impoverished villagers, leaving only a mild 
positive correlation, attributable principally to the uppermost crust of the poor (i.e., those 
rated 16 to 20 on the government Below Poverty Line, or BPL, scale, where 1 is the most 
                                                                                                                                                 
Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the 
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dire category).  It is difficult to interpret this result definitively, especially since the BPL 
data applies to the aggregate village level (i.e., it speaks to the percentage of poor in a 
village) instead of the individual/household level, which is the survey’s unit of analysis.  
However, one might theorize that the wealthiest of the poor benefit from the 
redistribution measures to a larger extent than do the most vulnerable demographics. 
 
Table 2.2.3-1.  Determinants of breakdowns in redistribution implementation at the village level in 
decreasing order of importance. 
 
Rank Standardized 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable 
1 0.454*** Government breakdowns at the taluka level 
2 0.214** Percentage of the village population below poverty line (Government index 1-20) 
3 0.212*** Distance of the taluka headquarters from the district headquarters 
4 
-0.184** Percentage of the village population below poverty line (Government index 1-15) 
5 0.152*** Village literacy rate 
6 0.113** Marginal agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
7 .109* Distance of the village from the taluka headquarters 
Explanatory power = 34%; *** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence 
level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey data, author’s calculations. 
 
Geographic distance again plays an important role in shaping village-level support for 
land redistribution.  The farther the taluka headquarters is from the district headquarters, 
the more barriers the village government puts up to redistribution measures, presumably 
owing to a weaker connection to progressive state policy.  Likewise, long distances from 
the village to the taluka headquarters also contribute to village-level breakdowns.  Here, 
we may want to pause for reflection, though: previously, we saw that increasing distance 
between village and taluka decreased breakdowns at the ground level.  Why should the 
village level be any different?  I would argue that we are observing two distinct pathways 
of influence, each running in the opposite direction.  That is, the effects at the ground 
                                                                                                                                                 
expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army… (Marx 1976 [1867], 790) 
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level stem from the ability (albeit decaying over distance) of community members to 
influence taluka government through personal petition—a right they are entitled to, and 
do, exercise, as we heard from the Sayla mamlatdar.  However, the verticalized influence 
pathways within the nested structure of local government are not designed to flow 
upward.  Information may flow upward, as in the case of talatis alerting mamlatdars to the 
presence of ALCA-eligible lands, who in turn then alert the Deputy and District 
Collector.  However, policy only flows (again, decaying with distance) downward.  
 
The weaker contributing factors to village government regressiveness largely resemble 
the ground level findings, save for one additional variable.  In parallel with the ground-
level analysis, village-level breakdowns rise mildly along with the proportion of the 
population in the top echelon of the BPL villagers only.  Likewise, the proportion of 
migrant agricultural laborers also correlates with village-level breakdowns.  Finally, 
however, the village literacy rate (a measure of little statistical significance at the ground 
level) also comes into play, fluctuating in sync with village government breakdowns.  
This variable should be regarded with skepticism, for, like the BPL proportions, it 
represented an aggregated, village-level datum that is imputed to household level data.  
Positing for a moment the existence of a completely neutral and objectively functioning 
panchayat government, however, the finding is nonetheless surprising.  In an objectively 
operating village government, we might expect a low literacy rate to adversely affect the 
quality of applications for lands to be redistributed, and therefore decrease the likelihood 
that the village government would process the applications efficiently.  However, we find 
just the opposite. 
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One conceivable (but cynical) explanation for this paradox is that village officials allied 
with local large landholders systematically create more problems when literacy rates rise 
in the hopes of counteracting a shift toward equity.  A more likely explanation is that 
villages with lower literacy rates will tend to have fewer applicants in general (due to lack 
of access to knowledge about the process and availability of lands), and will therefore be 
freed up to process the remaining applications with greater care.  Some anecdotal 
evidence for this explanation is provided by a Navsarjan fieldworker for Sayla taluka; she 
says that she constantly wages a battle against villagers’ lack of knowledge about lands 
availability.  Furthermore, when asked about his own greatest personal frustrations, the 
Sayla talati complained that he had so few personnel to deal with an overwhelming 
number of applications.  He went so far as to extol the state’s recent ban on applications 
coming from ex-servicemen from without the district. 
 
A cursory quantitative analysis would tend to support the second explanation of the 
literacy paradox.  A histogram of Dalit land recipients surveyed broken out by their 
village’s literacy rate (see the left-hand side of Figure 2.2.3-1) reveals a negatively-
skewed distribution.  Nor is this characteristic simply a representing the population as a 
whole: the right-hand side of Figure 2.2.3-1 shows the same histogram format applied to 
every village in Surendranagar district (N = 748), and the result is a very gently 
positively-skewed distribution.  The contrast between the two would suggest that the 
application process for redistributed lands acts as a filter for villages with low literacy 
rates.  In most cases, and especially in the lower end of the literacy rate spectrum, higher 
marginal literacy rates do in fact lead to more applications for land redistribution.  Since 
the Navsarjan survey did not target Dalits in random fashion (thereby collecting responses 
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from those who had not applied for or received lands at all), it is difficult to derive the 
relative importance of literacy’s benefits and costs.  However, if the proffered explanation 
is accepted, it is fair to say that literacy rates do not cause breakdowns at the village level, 
but rather constraints on administrative capacity do. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.3-1.  Histograms of Dalit land recipients surveyed (left) and Surendranagar district as a whole 
(right), both disaggregated based on literacy rate.  Would-be normal curves are displayed in black. 
Skewness (left) = -0.340; skewness (right) = 0.046. 
Source: 2006 survey data and the Census of India 2001; histograms by the author. 
 
2.2.4. Taluka-Level Breakdowns 
Breakdowns in land reform implementation at the taluka level take the form of either a 
failure to supply a title to the land in question, or a failure to survey the land.  The latter 
point more nuanced than it seems at first.  Survey-related threats to the redistribution 
process typically occur in two major variants: 
• A failure to survey, in whole or in part.  This problem is one of the present 
study’s criteria for measuring taluka-level breakdowns.  It occurs more frequently 
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in the case of government lands than with ALCA lands.  An astonishing 35.1% of 
government lands recipients in Surendranagar district reported an unperformed or 
incomplete survey of their lands, as opposed to only 17.5% among recipients of 
ALCA lands.23  It is true that ALCA lands were usually awarded before 
government lands, and so have had more of an opportunity to be surveyed, but 
neither category is particularly new.  Navsarjan field staff reported, for instance, 
that in Ranagar village, armed encroachers prevented survey crews from meting 
out a parcel of government land.  One possible explanation for the variance in 
survey enforceability is that lands falling under ALCA jurisdiction are presumably 
less likely to be designated as eligible for redistribution in the first place, since 
this involves the talati or mamlatdar identifying them as such.  Therefore, the 
comparison is skewed from the beginning, and prospective ALCA lands that 
might have brought out the armed encroachers upon survey, are still safe in the 
hands of the original landowners; 
• A failure to provide a necessary easement.  Many Dalit farmers (29% among 
ALCA recipients, 14.9% among government lands recipients) reported receiving 
land unaccompanied by an easement necessary either to access or irrigate it.  
Interviews with Dalit land recipients in Vanta Vachh village, Sayla Taluka, 
claimed that the reason for this is that any prospective easement for their land 
would necessarily run through Darbar private property, and thus was not granted.  
Navsarjan field staff indicate that ALCA lands exhibit this characteristic more 
often simply because redistributed private land tends to be located near un-
redistributed private land, whereas government lands tend to be near other 
                                                 
23
 A significant difference at the 99% confidence level. 
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government lands.  Critically, this issue is related to that of survey failures, in that 
upper-caste landowners may often choose which part of their land will be 
surveyed for redistribution.  Not only does this practice ensure that the worst of 
private lands is conveyed by the redistribution mechanism, but also makes it likely 
that the parcel will be inaccessible from public roads, further decreasing the 
likelihood of actual possession.  Despite its strong causal connection with the first 
survey-related problem, Navsarjan staff claim that taluka officials do not often 
take up the easement question, and it is thus not included in the first analysis. 
 
Fewer local factors have impacts on taluka-level implementation breakdowns than on 
those at the village level, and the model loses much of its explanatory power.  The most 
significant determinant of taluka-level breakdowns is the proportion of the village 
population below the poverty line (see Table 2.2.4-1, and APPENDIX C, Tables C-4).  
Again, great geographical distances separating the taluka from the district headquarters 
are also related to breakdowns.  Interestingly, while the proportion of the population 
designated as Scheduled Castes did not influence outcomes at lower levels, at the taluka 
level, applications from Dalit-heavy villages are more likely to encounter problems.  As 
with the literacy rate, we might hypothesize that villages with many Dalits also produce 
many applications, overwhelming the taluka’s capacity to cope.  Corroborating this 
notion, the Sayla taluka surveyor stated that he was the only surveyor  for 75 villages, and 
that his office was seriously understaffed.  Finally, small parcels appear to get overlooked 
at the taluka level.  One possible reason for this is that survey errors have a larger impact 
on small parcels, since the dummy variable for survey breakdowns runs continuously 
from 0 to 1, depending on the proportion of the parcel not surveyed. 
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Table 2.2.4-1.  Determinants of breakdowns in redistribution implementation at the taluka level in 
decreasing order of importance (easement difficulties excluded). 
 
Rank Standardized 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable 
1 
.272*** Percentage of the village population below poverty line (Government index 1-20) 
2 .160*** Distance of the taluka headquarters from the district headquarters 
3 -.185*** Scheduled Castes as a percentage of village population 
4 -.193*** Acres of redistributed parcel 
Explanatory power = 10.6%.  *** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence 
level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey data, author’s calculations. 
 
Interestingly, when easement-related problems are attributed to the taluka government, 
geographical distances (village-to-district, village-to-taluka, and taluka-to-district) 
account for the three strongest predictive factors. Furthermore influence of local village 
conditions strengthens markedly and the explanatory power of the model rises in step (see 
Table 2.2.4-2, and APPENDIX C, Tables C-5).  As the distances between villages and 
taluka headquarters, and taluka and district headquarters, rise, so to do the costs of 
covering those distances.  On issues of surveying and title allotment, the mamlatdar’s 
office (and particularly the surveyor and Revenue Circle Officer) is directly accountable 
to the Deputy and District Collectors.  Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that greater 
distances lower accountability and increase discretion.  Similarly, as the distance rises 
between the taluka office and the village, it becomes less likely for the survey process to 
be performed with all three mandated participants: Revenue Circle Officer, surveyor, and 
talati.  Since the two most likely not to be present as a result of great distances are the 
Revenue Circle Officer and the taluka surveyor, the process may be relatively more 
influenced by the talati (who, as we have established, often serves at the pleasure of the 
local large landholder) and the gathering villagers.  Even if both taluka officials are 
present to mete out the property, the taluka police may be less likely come great distances, 
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and mobs of encroachers may intimidate the officials (see Subsection 2.2.2).  Conversely, 
the closer the village is to the district headquarters, the less likely taluka-level 
breakdowns are to occur.  The preeminently likely explanation for this phenomenon is 
that the survey does not ask which institution performed the land survey.  Most often, it is 
the taluka surveyor, but in the case of a dispute or complaint, the matter goes to the 
district land surveyor in Surendranagar (step 6 in Figure B-3).  Therefore, the lower the 
transaction costs involved in notifying the district land surveyor and getting him or her to 
resurvey the land, the likelier it is that taluka-level problems can be remedied.  Again, we 
see that the local government hierarchy is host to multiple competing interests that in turn 
have multiple avenues for advancing their interests. 
 
Table 2.2.4-2.  Determinants of breakdowns in redistribution implementation at the taluka level in 
decreasing order of importance (easement difficulties included). 
 
Rank Standardized 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable 
1 -0.458*** Distance of the village from the district headquarters 
2 0.327*** Distance of the village from the taluka headquarters 
3 0.303*** Distance of the taluka headquarters from the district headquarters 
4 0.278*** Main agricultural laborers as a percentage of village population 
5 -.196*** Scheduled Castes as a percentage of village population 
6 -.174*** Village literacy rate 
7 
.147** Percentage of the village population below poverty line (Government index 1-20) 
Explanatory power = 19.3%.  *** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence 
level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey data, author’s calculations. 
 
 
2.3. Differential Treatment of ALCA and Government Lands 
The implementation of the land reforms impacts ALCA and government lands 
differentially (see Figure 2.3-1).  Generally speaking, recipients of ALCA lands are 
plagued with more and greater hurdles to cultivation than government land cultivators 
when dealing with their local governments or their communities.  Surveyors perform their 
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mandated duties less frequently.  Talatis will more easily allow the distribution of lands 
without access easements, as well as the persistence of encroachments on official village 
records.  On the ground, community members are more likely to resort to threats, 
violence, and intimidation to keep Dalits from farming, and encroachers are more likely 
to resist ejection. 
 
Two notable exceptions prove the rule: official title is more often granted to ALCA 
recipients than to government land farmers, and the khatavahis, or land ledgers, are more 
reliably provided to them.  This may be because most ALCA parcels were redistributed 
earlier than most government wastelands, at a time when less overall demand for 
agricultural land existed.  Thus, district, taluka, and village land offices may not have 
found themselves in the state of over-taxation to which many interviewed bureaucrats 
alluded.  Another, more cynical, explanation is that, since the ALCA is the state 
government’s flagship land reform program and is consequently subject to a incessant 
public scrutiny, it behooves district collectors to distribute the largest possible proportion 
of the officially-declared ALCA land titles.  Under this alternative explanation, whether 
lower government offices take the necessary steps to ensure those titles are more than 
empty promises is of less concern.  Whatever the reason, it is interesting to note that 
despite the greater desirability of ALCA lands with respect to government lands, the 
incidences of encroachment are quite comparable—perhaps because the selection process 
of ALCA lands tends not to redistribute the majority of eligible properties. 
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Figure 2.3-1.  Breakdowns by land type at the taluka, village, and ground levels. 
*** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey, author’s calculations.  
 
 
2.4. Social Outcomes of Land Reforms 
2.4.1. Positive Social Outcomes 
While recipients of ALCA lands typically face greater hurdles to cultivation than do 
government lands recipients, they also generally reap the greatest social rewards.  The 
left-hand side of Figure 2.4.1-1 shows that redistributed ALCA parcels are more effective 
at encouraging sedentism among migrant agricultural laborers, providing a feasible 
occupational alternative for manual scavengers, and boosting farmers’ social and 
economic status.  In Shiyen village, for example, the only Dalit farmer to receive ALCA 
lands had become markedly wealthier than his peers, and claimed openly to feel that his 
social status was better than theirs.  In general, successful cultivators of redistributed 
lands, and especially richer ALCA lands, may find themselves in an advantageous 
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position when applying for further lands in future.  On the one hand, they will be familiar 
with the bureaucratic system and better able to navigate it.  On the other hand, they may 
have made money from their farms with which to bribe crooked officials.24  In either 
case, a certain cumulative causation may kick in, countering the legal preference for the 
landless.  ALCA recipients are, however, less likely to be in possession of their lands, 
probably for the reasons mentioned in Subsection 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.4.1-1.  Positive and negative social outcomes of the land reforms by land type. 
*** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence level. 
Source: Navsarjan 2006 survey, author’s calculations. 
 
                                                 
24
 One Dalit recipient of 4 acres of ALCA lands in Kanpur later received twice the acreage of government 
wastelands that his Dalit peers received, despite being the only Dalit applicant already in possession of 
agricultural lands.  The same year he received his government lands, Navsarjan workers report that the local 
Talati and Revenue Circle Officer were found to be collaborating on a shady arrangement whereby they 
would allot larger parcels for bribes.  If the Kanpur Dalit paid these officials off to receive a larger share of 
government wastelands, he may have been able to do so because of his ALCA lands. 
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This study had too few respondents to the questions on improvements in their or their 
family’s educational or political status to generate statistically significant results.  
However, if one can trust the tentative trend in responses obtained, government wasteland 
recipients more frequently reported educational or political advancement in their 
community for themselves or their family members.  It is entirely consistent with the 
qualitative data obtained during the course of this study that agricultural laborers farming 
government land could both (a) not stop migrating completely and/or not have legal title 
to their promised lands, and (b) still experience educational and political advancement.  
Eight Dalit farmers interviewed in Vandavar village noted that they had mostly been 
migrant laborers prior to receiving awards for government wastelands in a dry wash.  In 
fact, they never received title for the land, as a dam was subsequently constructed 
downstream, seasonally flooding the promised fields for six months of every year.  They 
now lease the land on a yearly basis from the state.  Thus, the Dalits now have no title and 
must also continue to migrate in search of work for half of the year.  Despite these 
setbacks, however, they all reported educational, economic and social gains.  In the words 
of one farmer: 
Some of us have started small businesses, we have our kids in school, and we’ve built 
houses.  We have more money, and this has led to social improvements.  There is still a 
separate water well, though. 
 
 
This quote hints at another ambiguity that runs through much of Navsarjan’s work: does 
economic change precipitate social change, or vice versa?  While the Dalits interviewed 
often saw economic improvement as a necessary precondition for social status 
improvement (as did the Dalit farmer quoted above), Navsarjan staff often emphasized 
the reverse—that social improvements were often more crucial as first steps.  This 
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ambiguity can be traced back all the way to the first Marxian interpretations of Caste, and 
Althusser’s suggestion that in pre-capitalist societies, the superstructure may indeed 
dictate the dynamic of productive class formation.  In fact, there is anecdotal evidence 
that both of these may be true in different circumstances.  Navsarjan and the Dalits 
interviewed oftentimes view the dichotomy as a question of how broadly across the Dalit 
community the social status improvement spreads.  For instance, in Kanpur, one 
economically successful Dalit land recipient is now allowed to take tea at the palace (a 
sign of social acceptance), though migrating Dalits are still barred from doing so.  Thus, 
the economically successful are viewed as aberrations whose social status improvement 
may be tolerated, and does not significantly affect the broader social hierarchy.  
Conversely, the Shiyen community has known a more broad-based improvement in social 
standing that does not depend on case-by-case considerations of economic status.  One 
possible reason is that the Shiyen Dalits are a fairly tight-knit community and advocate 
for one another, whereas the Kanpur Dalit community is more diffuse.  As one Kanpur 
Dalit farmer surprisingly said: 
None of my community really helped me out.  Actually, the person who helped the most 
was the Sayla King’s younger brother, who was progressive, had heard of Navsarjan’s 
work, and has studied in the US, and he explained the situation to the Zamindar. 
A more strictly Marxian explanation is that the economic change in Shiyen just happened 
to affect a broader demographic, reached a critical mass, and thereby dictated a social 
paradigm shift.  However, the socially-driven explanation seems to carry more weight.  
After all, more Dalits claimed to have experienced social improvement than to have 
experienced economic improvement. 
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Dalit farmers almost always attributed educational advancement in the context of their 
families to the partial or total sedentism, and the resulting legal ability to enroll their 
children in the local school.  This trend mirrors that seen in the “reservation,” or 
affirmative action, system in Indian government: the largest benefits of the reservation are 
oftentimes reaped by the children of program beneficiaries through improved access to 
education (Wankhede 1999).  Even in the case of the Vandavar Dalits who still migrate, 
their children no longer migrate with them, and attend elementary and even high school.  
Likewise, legal residency in a particular village grants to migrant agricultural laborers the 
ability to vote and to run for office.  Many land recipients reported being members of the 
Gram Panchayat council, having joined political parties (even the BJP in some cases), 
and, in one case, becoming the village Sarpanch. 
 
2.4.2. Negative Social Outcomes 
By contrast, most of the redistribution “failures” occur more frequently with government 
lands than with ALCA lands (see Figure 2.4.1-1).  Redistribution failures are here 
considered to be any outcome that does not result in the sustained cultivation of a 
redistributed parcel: selling, foreswearing, breaking title conditions, or (a catch-all 
category) not cultivating.  In the case of government lands, each of these cases should 
theoretically result in the reversion of lands to government control.  In fact, this seldom 
happens, and the lands instead become the de facto property of another claimant.  The 
first three failures occur more often in the case of government lands, presumably because 
of the relatively low quality of the land (see Subsection 1.3.4).  However, non-cultivation 
is more often seen with ALCA lands than with government lands, probably for a number 
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of reasons relating to the competition for these valuable lands (some of which are 
discussed in Subsection 2.3). 
 
The first failure, foreswearing one’s claim to the land, is here presumed to be due to 
social pressure.  This is because, whether by cultivating or selling the land, the rightful 
owner might have improved his or her financial position, but did not or could not.  The 
second “failure” is the sale of one’s land and the de facto end of sustained cultivation.  
State law interdicts the sale of redistributed lands for a period of fifteen years (Jindal 
1982).  However, interviews with Navsarjan staff and Dalit land recipients (as well as the 
survey data) reveal that the ban on selling early does not in fact prevent recipients from 
doing just that. 
 
This practice often occurs as a variant on the following scenario: A beneficiary receives a 
plot, but for whatever reason, would rather sell it than cultivate it.  He makes an 
arrangement with a buyer whereby he receives a portion of the agreed-upon sale price 
(most often 50%) up front, in exchange for unofficially quitting the property.  When the 
tenure comes of age, the deal is concluded, and the farmer receives the rest of the sale 
price in return for official title.  None of the Dalits interviewed for this study testified to 
having charged interest on the outstanding balance, as would a bank with a mortgage 
loan.  The sum thus simply depreciates for up to 15 years.  In Chachka village, Limbdi 
taluka, for example, three Dalit families were given a combined 21 acres of ALCA lands, 
but sold them back to the original owners before the taluka surveyor even arrived, as they 
were unable to convince the original owners to quit the property and to take possession of 
it themselves (Navsarjan 2000).  There are interesting variations on this theme, as well.  
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In some villages, Dalit landowners are reportedly enticed to sell their long-term 
investments in return for jewelry or baubles.  In Ori village, the Darbars continue to farm 
their former lands, but also effectively pay off the new Dalit owners with the “rent” of a 
small monthly share.  In principle, this arrangement is not so far from a reversal of the 
Zamindari land tenancy system, except that the balance of power favors the tenant 
(instead of the landowner) and lowers therefore lowers the tenant’s rent. 
 
Dalit land sales do not automatically imply that social pressure is at work.  Those Dalits 
interviewed for this study who had sold their land, generally did not sell it back to 
intractable upper-caste encroachers—at least not officially.  Especially in the case of 
ALCA lands, large landholders legally stripped of their surplus lands prefer not to buy 
back their lands, for, while theoretically legal, this act automatically reactivates the 
ALCA’s applicability to them and they may find their land again confiscated.  They may, 
however, unofficially reassert control.  The Darbar descendent of the Devaliya village 
zamindars, for instance, admitted that while his family officially owned exactly 54 acres 
per adult male (the legal limit), in reality, they controlled and cultivated much more.  In 
any event, the reasons most often cited by Dalit land recipients for selling were high 
improvement costs and marginal land productivity—not social pressure or physical 
intimidation. 
 
The third failure, breaking the terms of redistribution, occurs primarily when the rightful 
owner fails to cultivate his parcel for three consecutive years, or fails to pay revenue on 
the property.  According to Dalit interviewees, both are symptoms of caste oppression.  In 
Talsana village in Lakhtar taluka, for instance, members of the Darbar community 
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reportedly intimidated one land recipient with the threat: “If you want to come cultivate it 
[the land], bring turmeric with you.”25  The non-payment of land revenue and inability to 
cultivate one’s land are sometimes linked in a vicious cycle: if Dalit farmers are unable to 
cultivate their land, they will be disinclined effectively to pay someone else’s taxes.  
Navsarjan fieldworkers have also reported that some Talatis may purposefully refuse to 
take land revenue from Dalit land recipients, instead marking them as delinquent in their 
payments so that their tenure rights are revoked (Navsarjan 2000a). 
                                                 
25
 Turmeric is made into a poultice to treat wounds. 
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3. ACTIVISM AND INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
 
In the following section, I describe Navsarjan’s organizational strategy (Subsection 3.1), 
its impact on our understanding of land redistribution success (Subsection 3.2).  I argue 
that Navsarjan implicitly understands the nested game that plays out at various levels of 
government, and accordingly gears its strategy to modifying the linkages between levels 
such that Dalit farmers benefit.  I then examine the weaknesses of the quantitative models 
employed in Section 2, in light of Navsarjan’s strategy and anecdotal qualitative evidence 
(Subsection 3.1).    I then examine avenues for future research (Subsection 3.3), and, in 
light of the findings, finally advance policy recommendations for the state and for 
Navsarjan as paradigmatic example of activist organizations dealing with land 
redistribution more generally (Subsection 3.4). 
 
3.1. Navsarjan’s Three-Pronged Strategy 
In Navsarjan’s December 1996 letter to the Surendranagar District Collector’s office 
detailing cases of failure in land redistribution implementation (the precursor to the suit 
filed with the High Court of Gujarat in Ahmedabad in April of 1999), the group describes 
itself as follows: 
“Navsarjan Trust” is a voluntary organization which provides assistance, education and 
legal aid to the poor people and also on the issues of violation of human rights [sic]. 
(Letter from Jamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti to the Surendranagar District Collector’s 
Office, 23/12/1996, in Navsarjan 2000, 59) 
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This statement cogently encapsulates not only the organization’s purpose, but also its 
operational strategy.  Rearranging the stated aspects of this strategy to align with the 
forgoing analysis of nested government (i.e., starting at the ground level and working up), 
we may state that the prongs of Navsarjan’s advocacy offensive are: 
• Education.  Navsarjan employs fieldworkers whose primary responsibility is to 
inform Dalit villagers of their legal rights with respect to the land reforms and the 
other relevant legislation, such as the Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989. 
• Bureaucratic facilitation.  Navsarjan fieldworkers inform village Dalits of lands 
that have been made available for redistribution, and help them to fill out and 
return the appropriate land redistribution forms. 
• Legal aid.  Navsarjan brings, or (often more effectively) threatens to bring, legal 
actions against non-performing government bodies. 
 
These three prongs may roughly equate to three tiers of engagement: at the ground level, 
at the level of local government, and at the level of state government (through the court 
system).  Because Navsarjan works simultaneously on these three tiers, the organization 
is able to choose at what level it will expend its limited resources for each particular 
challenge.  While the first two prongs are quite time-intensive to , and imply a case-by-
case tacticthe latter may demand a more generalizable complaint. 
 
Education.  Education consists of a mundane and a radical component.  The mundane 
component involves the diffusion of legal knowledge to reduce information asymmetries 
in the struggle for socioeconomic equality.  Rural Gujarat has a literacy rate of just 
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51.4%, as compared to urban Gujarat’s 71.2%26 (Census of India 2001).  These numbers 
drop drastically for various minority groups.  For instance, the literacy rate among Dalit 
women in India is just under 24% (CEDAW 2005).27  Dalit farmers may not have easy 
access to, or even the ability to read, the local periodicals in which parcel availability is 
published. 
 
The radical component to education is as necessary as it is difficult to quantify: bolstering 
the will of the Dalit community to stand up for their rights.   As Navsarjan workers 
repeated told a group of Dalit farmers in Vanta Vachh village upon receiving a host of 
land-related complaints, “You must stand up and fight for your own issues—don’t just 
tell us your woes.”  This “fighting spirit” has little to do with the size of the Dalit 
population—indeed, the percentage of Scheduled Castes as per the India Census 2001 
never once proved a statistically significant determinant of breakdowns at any level.  In 
Devaliya village in 2000, for example, Dalits comprised around 8.1% of the total village 
population (Census India 2001)—a number that, while low for the sample population, is 
1.2 percentage points higher than the rural Gujarati average.  And yet, Devaliya is 
notorious for its caste-bound land relations and the firm grasp its Darbars keep on the 
reins of power.  A tragic recent episode illustrated that low Dalit populations may not be 
the cause but rather the effect of land relations.  In March of 2003, according to local 
Dalits, a brother of the Devaliya “village king” got into an altercation with a local Dalit 
who complained the brother was stealing large, construction-worthy stones from his land.  
                                                 
26
 It bears noting that both rural and urban literacy rates in Gujarat trail their national counterparts, which 
stand at 59% and 80% respectively (Census of India 2001). 
27
 Human Rights Watch (2007) notes that the statistics reported to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on Dalit women’s literacy are quite dated, deriving from the 
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The Darbar formed a small band of friends who stabbed and killed the Dalit later that 
afternoon—a crime that has gone untried.  Since that fateful day, local Dalits report 
anecdotally that about half of the Dalit residents fled for larger, nearby urban centers.  A 
stroll through the former Dalit quarter confirms that many of the houses are still 
abandoned, or appropriated by other caste groups. 
 
Navsarjan attributes many successes on the ground not to sheer Dalit numbers, but to the 
mindset of local Dalits, which, they contend, is fortified by knowledge of their legal 
rights and recourses.  When asked why Darbars in Ori choose to bribe Dalits not to take 
possession of their rightful land, whereas Darbars in Talsana need only resort to open 
threats of physical violence, Navsarjan fieldworkers point to historical idiosyncrasies 
peculiar to each region that in turn manifest in differing expectations of what is possible 
in the minds of Dalits.  In Talsana, they say, the Grahak, or bonded labor, system was 
particularly prevalent during Zamindari times, and landowner clout thus carries over into 
the present.  Today’s landowners still have many Dalits in their employ as bonded 
laborers, and it is to the latter that the landowners legally conceded their surplus lands 
upon the passage of the ALCA.  The Dalits might legally own the surplus lands, but the 
Darbars essentially own the Dalits themselves through debt bondage.  Thus, neither 
Darbar nor Dalit ever expected that the Dalits would ever truly receive possession. 
 
Navsarjan employees also marshal other examples to emphasize the importance of Dalit 
mindsets in successful land redistribution.  They say that in some villages, when 
Navsarjan originally brought the affidavit to Dalit farmers so that they could sign it and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indian census of 1991.  I was not able to find more current figures for India as a whole, nor figures specific 
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put their complaints on public record, the Dalits brought the documents straight to their 
landlord and asked him whether they should in fact sign.  He advised them against it, and 
they backed down.  In Ghanejada village, the taluka issued three consecutive orders to the 
Dalits to take possession of their allotted lands, but the Dalits refused.  On the other hand, 
in Khadi village, one man fought for his rights and successfully took possession—an act 
that galvanized his peers to do likewise.  As important as courage, will, and determination 
are, though, it is extremely difficult to measure them, nor did this survey even attempt to 
do so.  Furthermore, even one could find an accurate metric for it, “strong will” may still 
be a confounding variable for knowledge of one’s legal rights, or for Navsarjan’s 
willingness to prosecute atrocities committed against Dalits. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Navsarjan employees downplay the importance of Dalit mindset 
when speaking to local government officials, though.  When the Talati of Sayla town 
asserted a very similar theory to that previously expressed by Navsarjan (“The subservient 
mindset of the Dalits themselves is the cause of their unwillingness to take possession of 
their lands.”), Navsarjan employees disagreed.  They countered that the primary 
responsibility lay with the Taluka government and their powers of police protection 
during the delicate period of title transfer. 
 
Bureaucratic facilitation.  Navsarjan also functions to reduce Dalit transaction costs in 
navigating the bureaucracy of land administration.  They do this first by informing Dalits 
of the land in the first place, and second by helping Dalits to fill out and submit the forms 
necessary to apply for the land, and to confirm title receipt (the latter serves to notify the 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Gujarat. 
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surveyor that the land is ready to be meted out).  In some cases (e.g., Kanpur village) 
during the mid-1990s, when Navsarjan was just beginning to work on the land 
redistribution issue, District Collectors and Mamlatdars had recorded the award of land 
titles to Dalit beneficiaries, but the so-called “beneficiaries” themselves had not ever 
received word of the award.  In such cases, Navsarjan also served to facilitate the flow of 
information down to the ground level.  Thus, Navsarjan’s efficacy is not only linked to its 
antagonistic role vis-à-vis the state, but also paradoxically its intercalation and 
embeddedness with the state that allows Navsarjan to increase the access to and 
effectiveness of government institutions for Dalits. 
 
Legal aid.  The PIL filed in 1999 illustrates that Navsarjan gives Dalits recourse to the 
law that they probably would not otherwise have.  Furthermore, the suit was lent extra 
weight by the fact that Navsarjan was co-petitioner with “Jamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti,” a 
group of affected citizens who banded together at Navsarjan’s suggestion.  In this way, 
Navsarjan’s PIL carried the authenticity of a spontaneous local movement.  While 
Navsarjan staff contend that they always aim to work alongside local communities in 
equal partnership, they also claim that Hamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti would never have 
been born without public awareness campaigns carried out by Navsarjan. 
 
Of the 6,000 acres that the PIL originally singled out as not having been in the possession 
of the intended Dalit beneficiaries, just over 2,000 still remained in January of 2007 
(though this number shifts depending on who is giving the information).  Of course, the 
almost 4,000 acres that have since been restored to Dalits are not necessary under their 
cultivation, for a host of reasons discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.  Nevertheless, the 
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improvement appears to be drastic by all accounts.  It is difficult to discern how much of 
this shift is due directly to the PIL, though.  It could theoretically be argued that state 
government was making progress on the land reforms even in the absence of Navsarjan, 
or, barring that, that some other exogenous factor was introduced into the game at around 
the same time.  Most of the Dalits interviewed, though, had received land titles or 
promises of land titles long before Navsarjan became involved in Surendrangar district in 
1995.  Most testified to the crucial role Navsarjan played in overcoming bureaucratic 
inertia or local community resistance.  Some Dalits in Kanpur had effectively been in a 
holding pattern since their original application in 1967 when Navsarjan intervened in 
1995, getting the promised land surveyed that same year.  Likewise in Vanta Vachh, one 
man claimed that he originally faced resistance from the former landlord until Navsarjan 
interceded with the local government. 
 
Navsarjan’s role as bureaucratic facilitator also bleeds into its role as legal activist.  For 
officially filing suit in the Gujarat High Court is merely at one (adversarial) extreme end 
of a spectrum of strategies designed to make use of government institutions.  It also 
exemplifies one of Navsarjan’s key strategies: to bypass local governments that are less 
amenable to their cause for higher-level governments that may bring pressure to bear on 
them.  And while Navsarjan is currently contemplating filing further PILs, Navsarjan staff 
have observed that threatening to take legal action can oftentimes be as effective as 
actually taking it.  This, they claim, is the case in Sayla Taluka, which used to be 
notorious for its regressive government, but whose officials now often consult Navsarjan 
before taking action on land reform issues.  Navsarjan fieldworkers are even notified of 
opportunities to attend Sayla land surveys.  Presumably, the Sayla mamlatdar, himself an 
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upper caste-member, prefers satisfying Navsarjan directly to dealing with reproaches 
from the District Collector.  The threat of legal action can also connect the legal aid 
strategy prong to that of educating Dalits to embolden them.  In Nagarka village, in which 
hostility toward Dalit farmers was particularly strong, only one of 12 Dalit land recipients 
is today cultivating his land.  Navsarjan attributes the success of that farmer to their 
promise of legal support in the case of an atrocity. 
 
Whatever the reason, there has been a noticeable improvement in local governments’ 
performance of those functions constituting land reform implementation from 1996 to 
2006 (see Figure 3.1-1).28  Taluka and village governments showed remarkable 
improvement in all comparable categories, save that of granting title to ALCA lands, in 
which 1996 and 2006 exhibited roughly similar numbers (with percentages in the low 
90s).  Most strikingly, the general change trend (as depicted by red midpoint lines) seems 
to drift farther into positive territory at higher levels of government.  The least amount of 
progress has been made at the ground level, with actual possession making modest but 
tangible gains, and non-encroachment (counting partial encroachments) remaining more 
or less unchanged. 
                                                 
28
 The 1996 and 2006 surveys had few directly corresponding questions.  Furthermore, for reasons relating 
to 1996 data reporting, it is impossible to compare the same four talukas.  Rather, the 1996 data refers to 
four talukas located nearby, but in different districts: Viramgam taluka in Ahmedabad district, Vallabhipur 
taluka in Bhavnagar district, Degham taluka in Gandhinagar district, and Jasdan taluka in Rajkot district.  
Nevertheless, Surendranagar district has the worst reputation in terms of land reform implementation (the 
reason Navsarjan started working there in the first place), and so if there is a regional bias, it will likely be 
against, rather than for, improvement in government performance during the intervening years. 
 
The method of data reporting for the 1996 Navsarjan survey in the four Surendranagar talukas surveyed in 
2006 was to report the absolute number of instances of government failures in the land reform 
implementation process.  There was no sense of a denominator, and so failure rates as percentages were 
impossible to derive.  This omission in itself may say something about Navsarjan’s early approach to the 
issue, in that it seems part of a “name and shame” strategy designed to spur the government into action,.  In 
other words, rather gauging the relative extent of the various problems, Navsarjan was more interested in 
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Figure 3.1-1.  A comparison of survey responses for selected questions from 1996 and 2006.  
*** = 99% confidence level; ** = 95% confidence level; * = 90% confidence level.  These confidence 
levels refer to Chi-Square statistics between land types for the same year. 
Source: Navsarjan 1996,2006 survey, author’s calculations. 
 
These change trends hint at two underlying phenomena.  First, as I have argued in Section 
2, the government hierarchy represents a contested terrain, on which offices 
geographically and institutionally closer to local elites may be more resistant to land 
reform, and offices more distant from local elites will be more susceptible to reform.  
Second, assuming that Navsarjan is the primary catalyst of change, the trend may also 
reflect Navsarjan’s strategy of selective engagement with various tiers of government.  
For while Navsarjan’s tactics are not primarily top-down in nature, the aforementioned 
recalcitrance at lower levels of government (as well as the cost of trying to reform each of 
the hundreds of village governments in any given district) has the inevitable effect of 
driving the organization to focus increasingly on taluka, district, and state-level 
                                                                                                                                                 
pointing out that the problems existed at all.  This “zero tolerance” view is echoed in their stance on manual 
 98
government interventions.  This shift of focus may then come to resemble the “trickle-
down” effect suggested by Figure 3.1-1. 
 
3.2. Implicit Critiques of Quantitative Land Reform Outcome Models 
Even the most robust of the quantitative models, that predicting variation in success rates 
of actual Dalit parcel possession and cultivation based on local socioeconomic factors and 
government obstacles (or “breakdowns”), was only able to explain about 57% of the 
statistical variation (see APPENDIX C, Table C-6).  There must be other factors at work.  
This subsection considers a few categories of possible factors.  These are: the influence of 
Navsarjan itself, other government bodies and programs, and social, historical and 
cultural dynamics. 
 
Navsarjan’s Influence.  Subsection 3.1 introduces considerations of land reform success 
that were not taken into consideration in the quantitative analyses in Section 2.  Most 
obviously and most generally, none of the effects of Navsarjan’s own three-pronged 
efforts were assessed, whether disaggregated by prong or bundled.  Simple lack of 
information on Navsarjan’s program foci over the past 12 years is the principal cause of 
this omission.  When asked if he would have been able to obtain his land without 
Navsarjan’s help, though, one Kanpur Dalit said, “One hand needs the other to clap,” 
hinting at Navsarjan’s instrumental role in land reform. 
 
Other Government Intervention.  Other government priorities may in certain cases 
clash with that of land redistribution.  The government departments overseeing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
scavenging, which does not seek to diminish the practice, but to abolish it altogether. 
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competing interests may not effectively coordinate with one another.  In two villages 
visited for this study, Vanta Vachh and Vandavar, government wastelands identified for 
redistribution by the Agriculture Department were subsequently flooded by a dam built by 
a separate government agency.  Also in Vanta Vachh, one Dalit (of a total of eight Dalit 
land recipients) received government wastelands from the Revenue Circle Officer only to 
have them rescinded by the district, which had reallocated the land to local businessman 
planning to dig a rock quarry there (ownership of minerals and extractive resources is 
reserved to the state). 
 
Society and Culture.  Many local social and cultural idiosyncrasies may also come to 
bear on the success of land reform legislation.  Certain jatis are superstitious about 
scavengers, believing them to have mystical powers to curse the land.  Navsarjan 
fieldworkers report that in Bhatuli village, for instance, a Vayisha caste-member received 
12 acres under the Land Tenancy Act, but would not cultivate the land for fear of a Dalit 
curse.  Scavengers cultivated four of the acres, and the landholder entreated them to 
remove the curse from the remaining eight acres by throwing them a feast. 
 
It is also clear that Navsarjan places enormous emphasis on education and “Dalit 
mindsets” as key determinants of the success or failure of the land reforms in any 
particular village.  Whether Navsarjan contributes in any way to bolstering these assets is 
a separate issue, but the fact remains that neither of these factors were considered.   
 
Moreover, the broad category of “Dalit” may be too crude to allow for a sufficiently fine-
grained analysis.  Specific jati identities of land recipients and land encroachers 
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sometimes make a critical difference in the success of reforms.  In Paccham village, 
Tanduka taluka, Ahmedabad district, for instance, about 40 Vankar (weaver) and 3 
Bhangi (scavenger) families received redistributed lands in total.  While the weaver 
families have known considerable success in cultivation, none of the scavenger families 
have been able to take possession.  Nor do the two Dalit communities demonstrate 
solidarity in the face of caste discrimination, according to Navsarjan fieldworkers. 
 
Finally, the specific social networks that Dalits and upper-castes form may prove decisive 
in a land dispute.  The even distribution of titles to 54-acre parcels among all male family 
members over the age of 18 years is a common practice in large landholding families to 
avoid government confiscation of surplus lands.  However, the Darbar “village king” of 
Tavi village claimed that his brother was not yet 18 when his lands came under scrutiny, 
and he had no one else to whom he could nominally cede his lands.  By contrast, the 
Darbar “king” of Devaliya had a large extended family network that facilitated the shelter 
of many of his holdings.  Thus, the presence or lack of “social capital” can hinder upper-
caste ability to counter redistributive policies.  Likewise, Dalits may form social 
networks, or may be more or less unified as a category. 
 
3.3. Avenues for Further Research 
Future research can build on the present study in a few important ways.  It might make up 
for some of the methodological shortcomings of this study pointed out in Subsection 3.2, 
or it might make a more rigorous, quantitative assessment of asset ownership in rural 
Gujarat.  Following the first tactic, future research might attempt first to assess 
Navsarjan’s impact on land redistribution by measuring breakdowns in the path toward 
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cultivation in a certain random sample of villages in which Navsarjan is active, and in a 
corresponding sample of villages in which Navsarjan does not operate.  Certain 
methodological problems would arise: first, Navsarjan may not operate in a particular 
village, but still operate in that taluka or district.  Second, other Dalit rights groups may 
concomitantly operate in certain villages.  Third, it is not clear what criterion would be 
measured.  Measuring obstacles thrown up to cultivation and the incidence of successful 
cultivation, as this study has done, does not necessarily speak to the larger issue of asset 
ownership by caste.  This point is taken up again below.  Further research might also 
attempt to boost the explanatory power of the models by measuring legal knowledge and 
“fighting spirit” of the Dalit community, taking into consideration the specific 
socioeconomic attributes of each Dalit land recipient (jati, income, asset ownership, etc.), 
and quantifying Navsarjan’s own efforts in each village (whether by numbers of 
fieldworkers assigned per village, number of bureaucratic facilitations, etc.).  
Alternatively, an in-depth qualitative study might examine strong Dalit social networks to 
determine why they develop in certain villages and not in others. 
 
Finally, any study on the land redistribution issue must certainly document actual land 
ownership by demographic group.  Such an understanding would require complete land 
records for those areas studied to determine the percentage of land owned by Dalits, 
normalized by the percentage of Dalits in that population.  Preferably, this would be done 
for multiple years over a given period stretching from before the PIL to after it, so that a 
time-elapse regression model could be constructed to gauge the effects of the PIL, and 
Navsarjan’s other interventions.  In effect, this tactic would yield a Gini coefficient of 
land ownership by which to measure socioeconomic progress. 
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3.4. Policy Recommendations 
As should now be clear, the line between the state and civil society in Gujarat is blurred 
with respect to land reform policy implementation.  Instead of a neutral and monolithic 
state, we see that the state is a framework in which interests compete and in which groups 
like Navsarjan attempt to tip the scales in their cause’s favor.  The distinction between 
Navsarjan and the communities in which it works is also not perfectly clean, for while the 
group claims to be an organic outgrowth of the Dalit community, it does not merely 
reflect and communicate Dalit concerns.  Rather, it continually pushes the edge of the 
envelope in formulating Dalit demands, while encouraging Dalit farmers to follow suit—
often an act of defiance well outside the comfort zone of the community it purports to 
represent.  While Navsarjan administration sometimes portrays caste conflict over land as 
occurring between righteous Dalits and activist groups on the one hand, and nefarious 
upper castes and the government on the other, in fact activists, farmers, and government 
form an uneasy triangle defined more by their intercalation and at times what Sanyal 
(1991) terms “antagonistic cooperation,” than by their independence.  Therefore, while 
policy recommendations are divided into those directed at the state and those directed at 
Navsarjan for the sake of convenience, the distinction at the margins is somewhat 
arbitrary. 
 
3.4.1. Policy Recommendations for the State 
• Codify variable land ceilings at the state level.  Differential agricultural land 
quality demands a flexible system of land ceilings.  In principle, state policy 
addresses this issue by allowing taluka mamlatdars to set local ceilings below the 
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state level.  In practice, this study has shown that different caste interests influence 
the taluka government.  A mamlatdar who broke with precedent to introduce 
lower land ceilings would be seen as taking sides in this battle.  Yet the need for 
variable land ceiling will only grow.  The vast tracts of land to be brought under 
irrigation in the coming years due to the Narmada Canal scheme will effectively 
tilt the balance of agricultural power in favor of current landholders.  Therefore, 
the state should mandate a variable land ceiling capable of accounting for soil 
quality, rainfall, and irrigation.  Such a mandated policy application would 
effectively render the mamlatdar blameless in the eyes of local landholders. 
 
• Centralize land records at the district and state levels.  This policy 
recommendation stems from the fact that the talati and, recently, the mamlatdar 
are the only officials capable of identifying lands eligible for redistribution.  With 
a more centralized land records system, preferably in the form of an updated 
geographic information system (GIS) capable of identifying overlapping and 
missing parcels, parcel ownership, and land quality, state oversight of ALCA 
lands declaration would be strengthened and local government accountability 
improved.  Such a reform would have also to safeguard against caste interests 
influencing data entry and amendment. 
 
• Conduct a participatory investigation of alleged surplus lands.  With only 
7.5% of originally estimated ALCA lands now declared and allotted, the state 
government should conduct an inventory to assess what became of the balance.  
The afore-mentioned GIS would greatly facilitate such an exercise.  It is not 
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inconceivable that the land ceiling policy simply precipitated a vast intra-familial 
decentralization of land ownership, while largely keeping the estates not only 
within the caste group, but within the family unit.  If this is indeed the case, the 
state may need to consider a radical amendment to the current ALCA in order to 
accomplish the act’s original aims.  If intra-familial ownership decentralization is 
not the case, and lands were simply never even declared as surplus under the act, 
the state can then take the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the 
land reforms.  Furthermore, such an inventory could be greatly aided by inviting 
anonymous tips and suspicions from local inhabitants—a parcel exceeding the 
land ceiling that had long gone without official recognition might be identified by 
local landless persons in the knowledge that they might apply for the parcel once 
made available under the ALCA.  
 
• Create land disputes committees.  The state should establish streamlined 
institutions for hearing and redressing encroachment complaints.  Such 
institutions might take the form of standing land dispute committees, jointly run 
by local talukas and community groups.  At present, survey complaints may be 
sent to the District Surveyor, and the talati and mamlatdar may deal with 
encroachment complaints on a tediously slow, case-by-case basis.  Furthermore, 
upper-caste members may often simply take the matter to court, where the 
proceedings can drag on for 10 years or more, by which time the Dalit may have 
relented or been reduced to penury.  With roughly 60% of Dalit land recipients 
reporting some form of encroachment, and recourse to the courts often 
prohibitively expensive and/or too time-consuming, it is imperative to create a 
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standing mechanism to address systematically and expeditiously the numerous 
unresolved issues.  Furthermore, if the committee were vested with the power to 
amend land ledgers, a major hurdle to credit access and successful cultivation 
could be overcome—at a 90% breakdown rate, the lack of ledger amendments is 
the most prevalent governmental obstacle to land reform implementation. 
 
3.4.2. Policy Recommendation for Navsarjan 
• Foster Dalit social networks.  Navsarjan should work not just to educate and 
animate the Dalit fighting spirit, but also to coordinate their efforts and form their 
own social networks or even political party.  In most villages visited during the 
course of this study, the Dalit community was badly splintered, and did not see 
itself as a cohesive power.  Furthermore, Dalits often see the local “Zamindar” as 
more of a resource to be drawn upon than their peers.  This view only perpetuates 
the patronage system.  The formation of social networks, both within a single 
village (such as Jamin Hakk Rakshan Samiti) and among groups of villages, could 
provide an alternative resource to be utilized for agricultural products storage, 
access to sales markets, knowledge sharing, economies of scale in input 
purchases, and application of political pressure. 
 
• Form regularized relations with all local governments.  Navsarjan’s 
relationship with the government of Sayla taluka, which consults Navsarjan on 
land reform implementation, should become a model for future relationships with 
local governments.  Physical distance between different tiers of local government 
greatly contributes to breakdowns at the village levels.  Since Navsarjan works 
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regularly in many villages, they may serve as a communication link between 
government offices, effectively shrinking the distance.  While Navsarjan does this 
to a certain extent at present by taking complaints to taluka officials and alerting 
them to the land reform derailments on the ground, the practice could be expanded 
in scope and regularized in terms of periodicity.  Such a tactic might cast 
Navsarjan in a less adversarial light, and as more of an “antagonistic cooperator” 
(see, e.g., Sanyal 1991).  
 
• Offer to help with land surveys.  In the spirit of the previous suggestion, 
Navsarjan should explore the possibility of having its staff trained and certified in 
land surveying techniques, so as to offer its services to local taluka magistrates.  In 
effect, Navsarjan would act as a progressive consulting service.  Between 60-80% 
of Dalits surveyed reported that their land had not been surveyed, or had not been 
surveyed properly.  Taluka governments have few surveyors, and sometimes have 
only one to cover tens or even hundreds of villages.  It seems unlikely that 
Navsarjan could credibly charge the taluka government for such a service.  Rather, 
a well-trained Navsarjan team, so long as it adhered to the strictest standards of 
objectivity in carrying out its duties, might provide Dalits and other land reform 
beneficiaries with proper surveys, while simultaneously lightening the workload 
for local taluka governments.  Thus the interest of local governments and 
Navsarjan might be served simultaneously.
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LIST OF TERMS 
 
Bhangi:  Literally “Manual Scavengers,” bhangi constitute the lowest sub-caste of the 
Dalits.  They are considered in the ideology of purity and putrefaction to be the most 
impure sub-caste, and are charged with the manual removal from villages of human and 
animal feces, and the bodies of dead animals. 
 
Brahman:  The highest-ranking Varna, the Brahmans are the priestly class and have 
often claimed to be descendents of Indo-Aryans, who are believed to have migrated to the 
subcontinent in the second millennium BCE. 
 
Chamar:  The middle-ranked of three Dalit sub-castes, the Chamar are traditionally 
restricted to the occupation of skinning animals, preparing hides, and leatherworking. 
 
Dalit:  Literally “Broken People,” Dalits are also referred to as Parjanya, Antyaja, 
“untouchables,” “outcastes,” and, in legal terms, “Scheduled Castes” in reference to the 
fact that they do not belong to a Varna caste.  They fall outside of the Varna system, but 
nonetheless rank lower than all Varna in social practice.  The term ‘Dalits’ as used in 
Gujarat encompasses three major subgroups (again listed in descending order of purity): 
the Weavers (Vankar), the Leatherworkers (Chamar), and the Scavengers (Bhangi) 
(ibid.).  They may self-identify as Hindu, Muslim, or Christian. 
 
Gram panchayat:  Local government of a village. 
 
Kamin:  Refers to the lower castes in the jajmani system. 
 
Kilvaram:  The “lower share” of the land revenues in the Zamindari system, which non-
Brahman landowners could keep for themselves. 
 
Kshtriya:  The second-highest ranking Varna and the “Warrior Caste.”  The Kshtriya 
have traditionally been kings and warriors, and were collectively considered by the 
British to exhibit certain personality traits, such as fidelity, honor, pride, courage, 
belligerence, and physical strength. 
 
Jajman: Refers to the upper caste patrons in the jajmani system. 
 
Jajmani system:  A system of caste patronage regulating social interaction among castes 
based on the concepts of purity and putrefaction.  The jajmani system is seen by some 
scholars as mere exploitation clothed, while others (see, e.g., Bremin 1975) contend that 
it constituted a vehicle for caste bargaining (albeit one weighted in favor of upper castes).  
The name refers to the upper-caste patrons, or Jajmans.  The lower castes were referred to 
as Kamin. 
 
Jati:  Literally “births,” jatis are sub-castes that fall theoretically, though not always 
neatly, within the Varna system.  Distinctions are based on occupation acceptable for 
adoption by group members. 
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Mamlatdar:  A taluka-level official charged with overseeing the implementation of the 
Land Ceiling Act.  His office also includes a Revenue Circle Officer and a surveyor. 
 
Melvaram:  The “upper share” of the land revenues in the zamindari system, which 
Brahmans were owed by non-Brahman zamindars. 
 
Mleccha:  Refers to those areas antagonistic to the Brahmanical system during the spread 
of  Buddhist kingdoms during the Buddhist Magatha-Maurya empires from the 7th to 2nd 
centuries BCE. 
 
Panchayat:  A grouping of five villages in a quincunx, headquartered at a central village. 
 
Panchayat samiti:  The government of a taluka. 
 
Sarparch:  The mayor of a village or gram panchayat. 
 
Scheduled Castes: The legal term for ‘Dalit,’ so called because they fall under the 
definition and protections set forth in the Fifth Schedule of the Indian constitution. 
 
Scheduled Tribes: The legally defined indigenous peoples of India, so called because 
they fall under the definition and protections set forth in the Fifth Schedule of the Indian 
constitution. 
 
Sudra:  The fourth and lowest Varna in the caste system, composed of farmers and 
agriculturalists. 
 
Talati:  A panchayat-level official charged with land revenue collection and 
identification of landholding in excess of the land ceiling. 
 
Taluka: A sub-District level unit of local government that generally consists of a central 
town, potentially other towns, and a number of villages.  The government of a taluka is 
referred to as a panchayat samiti. 
 
Toch Maryadha: Government “wastelands” deemed cultivable and distributed to 
vulnerable beneficiaries under the Government Lands Programme. 
 
Vaishya:  The third-highest Varna, or caste, composed of merchants, traders, and 
retailers. 
 
Vankar:  Literally “Weavers,” the highest sub-caste of the Dalits, whose appointed 
occupation is the cleaning and weaving of wool. 
 
Varna:  The Hindu religious system of broad caste groupings.  The term also refers to 
classes of broad caste groupings themselves.  These latter include, in descending order of 
purity, Brahman (scholars, teachers and priests), Kshtriya (kings, vassals and warriors), 
Vaishya (merchants, traders, and retailers), and Sudra (agriculturalists and farmers).  The 
Varna are said to correspond to the various parts of the body of the divinity Purasha, from 
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which they are derived.  Thus, Brahmans were made from the head, Kshtriya from the 
arms, Vaishya from the torso, and Sudra from the legs. Outside of the Varna system, but 
nonetheless ranked lower than all Varna in social practice, are the Dalits. 
 
Zamindari system:  Land revenue system under which absentee feudal landlords, or 
Zamindars, collected revenues for the Mughal and British governments from renters.  The 
latter in turn used employed and bonded labor to cultivate the fields. 
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APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE LAND REDISTRIBUTION EFFORTS 
 
 
Table A-1.  Land redistribution efforts in various Indian states, with scheduled caste recipients extracted. 
 
Total 
Redistribution Redistribution to Scheduled Castes 
State 
Area 
(‘000s 
Ac.) 
Recipients 
(‘000s) 
Area 
(‘000s 
Ac.) 
Recipients 
(‘000s) 
% Share 
of Area 
% Share of 
Recipients 
% Share 
of Area 
% Share of 
Recipients 
Average 
Area 
Andhra 
Pradesh 594.4 521.6 226.9 216.5 38.2 41.5 12.6 121.7 10.4 
Assam 479.9 441.8 45.7 43.4 9.5 9.8 2.5 2.3 1.1 
Bihar 303.2 372.5 179.2 229.8 59.1 61.7 9.9 12.4 0.8 
Gujarat 134.0 31.4 83.2 14.6 62.1 46.5 4.6 0.8 5.2 
Haryana 87.3 27.4 37.6 11.8 43.1 42.9 2.1 0.6 3.2 
Himachal 
Pradesh 3.3 4.4 2.3 2.9 69.0 66.7 0.1 0.2 0.8 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 45.0 450.0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Karnataka 117.1 31.4 71.1 19.0 60.7 60.3 3.9 1.0 3.8 
Kerala 64.3 145.1 25.2 62.2 39.0 42.8 1.4 3.4 0.4 
Madhya 
Pradesh 185.3 72.1 49.4 21.5 26.7 29.8 2.7 1.2 2.3 
Maharashtra 554.9 14.6 161.7 41.9 29.1 29.8 8.9 2.3 3.9 
Orissa 154.3 135.2 49.1 45.6 31.8 33.7 2.7 2.5 1.1 
Punjab 103.5 28.3 44.0 11.3 42.5 40.0 2.4 0.6 3.9 
Rajasthan 452.2 77.9 145.3 28.5 32.1 36.5 8.0 1.5 5.1 
Tamil Nadu 162.4 135.2 62.1 59.7 38.2 44.2 3.4 3.2 1.0 
Uttar Pradesh 390.5 346.2 263.8 236.6 67.6 68.3 14.6 12.8 1.1 
West Bengal 965.3 2,151.6 359.5 800.9 37.2 37.2 19.9 43.3 0.4 
Total 5,213.3 5,120.9 1,807.6 1848.8 34.7 36.1 100.0 100.0 1.0 
Mean 282.2 293.3 106.3 108.6 40.4 40.7 5.9 12.3 2.6 
Median 162.4 135.2 62.1 41.9 38.2 41.5 3.4 2.3 1.1 
Source: Report of the National Commission for SCs/STs, 1995-1996, extracted in Thorat, Social Security for SCs in 
unorganized sector in S.M. Dev & others, Social and Economic Security in India, 2001, p. 371 Delhi. 
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APPENDIX B: LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIGRAMS 
 
 
 
Figure B-1.  Organigram of the assessment and selection process for land redistribution under the 
ALCA. 
Source: the author. 
 
Figure B-2.  Organigram of the assessment and selection process for land redistribution under the 
ALCA. 
Source: the author. 
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Figure B-3.  Organigram of the implementation process for land redistribution under both the ALCA 
and Government Lands Programme. 
Source: the author. 
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APPENDIX C: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SECTION 2 
 
Tables C-1. Regression results for determinants of breakdowns at the ground level. 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
BPL_20_Cumperc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, MargAL_perc, GovBD_14, 
Val/Ac, Land Type, MainAL_perc, Workers_perc, TalukaHQ_Dist(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_02 
 
 Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.647(a) .418 .386 .39408 
a  Predictors: (Constant), BPL_20_Cumperc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, MargAL_perc, GovBD_14, Val/Ac, 
Land Type, MainAL_perc, Workers_perc, TalukaHQ_Dist 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
17.991 9 1.999 12.871 .000(a) 
Residual 25.004 161 .155     
1 
Total 42.994 170       
a  Predictors: (Constant), BPL_20_Cumperc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, MargAL_perc, GovBD_14, Val/Ac, 
Land Type, MainAL_perc, Workers_perc, TalukaHQ_Dist 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_02 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 
-1.169 .322   -3.630 .000 
Land Type 
-.222 .067 -.219 -3.311 .001 
Val/Ac 
.000 .000 .129 1.904 .059 
TalukaHQ_Dist 
-.023 .006 -.310 -4.072 .000 
TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance .009 .003 .180 2.653 .009 
MainAL_perc 1.013 .542 .126 1.869 .063 
MargAL_perc 2.508 .658 .244 3.809 .000 
Workers_perc 1.675 .429 .266 3.906 .000 
GovBD_14 
.295 .041 .448 7.124 .000 
1 
BPL_20_Cump
erc 
2.213 .551 .306 4.016 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: GovBD_02 
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Tables C-2.  Two-stage least squares analysis of the effects of village-level government breakdowns in 
land redistribution on ground-level breakdowns. 
 
MODEL:  MOD_1. 
_ 
 
Equation number:    1 
 
Dependent variable.. GovBD_02 
 
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
 
Multiple R           .44461 
R Square             .19768 
Adjusted R Square    .19293 
Standard Error       .45179 
 
            Analysis of Variance: 
 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
 
Regression 1 8.498878 8.4988779 
Residuals 169 34.495274 .2041140 
 
F =      41.63789       Signif F =  .0000 
 
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
Variable  B  SE B  Beta  T Sig T 
 
GovBD_14 .293006  .045408  .444607  6.453 .0000 
(Constant)  -.099244 .131035  -.757  .4499 
 
Correlation Matrix of Parameter Estimates 
 
             GovBD_14 
 
GovBD_14    1.0000000 
 
 
 
 121
Tables C-3.  Determinants of Breakdowns at the Village Level 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MargAL_perc, GovBD_22, TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance, TalukaHQ_Dist, BPL_15_Cumperc(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_14 
 
 Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.597(a) .357 .339 .647 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MargAL_perc, GovBD_22, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, 
TalukaHQ_Dist, BPL_15_Cumperc 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
60.145 7 8.592 20.500 .000(a) 
Residual 108.552 259 .419     
1 
Total 168.697 266       
a  Predictors: (Constant), Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MargAL_perc, GovBD_22, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, 
TalukaHQ_Dist, BPL_15_Cumperc 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_14 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.286 .283   4.543 .000 
GovBD_22 
.397 .046 .454 8.676 .000 
BPL_15_Cump
erc 
-2.343 1.079 -.184 -2.171 .031 
BPL_20_Cump
erc 
2.690 1.119 .214 2.405 .017 
TalukaHQ_Dist 
.013 .007 .109 1.756 .080 
TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance .015 .004 .212 3.670 .000 
MargAL_perc 1.687 .767 .113 2.199 .029 
1 
Lit_perc 1.241 .473 .152 2.624 .009 
a  Dependent Variable: GovBD_14 
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Tables C-4. Determinants of Breakdowns at the Taluka Level (Without Easements) 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
SC_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_20_Cumperc, Acres(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_22 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.345(a) .119 .106 .849 
a  Predictors: (Constant), SC_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_20_Cumperc, Acres 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
27.108 4 6.777 9.402 .000(a) 
Residual 200.384 278 .721     
1 
Total 227.492 282       
a  Predictors: (Constant), SC_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_20_Cumperc, Acres 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_22 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 
.394 .177   2.230 .027 
Acres 
-.048 .015 -.193 -3.263 .001 
BPL_20_Cump
erc 
3.972 .862 .272 4.609 .000 
TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance .013 .005 .160 2.752 .006 
1 
SC_perc 
-1.902 .614 -.185 -3.100 .002 
a  Dependent Variable: GovBD_22 
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Tables C-5.  Breakdowns at the Taluka Level (With Easements) 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MainAL_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, 
TalukaHQ_Dist, SC_perc, DistrictHQ_Dist(a) . Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_23 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.462(a) .214 .193 .81235 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MainAL_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, 
TalukaHQ_Dist, SC_perc, DistrictHQ_Dist 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
46.504 7 6.643 10.067 .000(a) 
Residual 170.918 259 .660     
1 
Total 217.422 266       
a  Predictors: (Constant), Lit_perc, BPL_20_Cumperc, MainAL_perc, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, 
TalukaHQ_Dist, SC_perc, DistrictHQ_Dist 
b  Dependent Variable: GovBD_23 
 
 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.055 .450   2.344 .020 
BPL_20_Cump
erc 
2.094 1.030 .147 2.033 .043 
TalukaHQ_Dist 
.045 .012 .327 3.854 .000 
DistrictHQ_Dist 
-.039 .009 -.458 -4.427 .000 
TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance .024 .006 .303 4.094 .000 
MainAL_perc 3.921 .869 .278 4.513 .000 
SC_perc 
-2.031 .725 -.196 -2.801 .005 
1 
Lit_perc 
-1.606 .812 -.174 -1.979 .049 
a  Dependent Variable: GovBD_23 
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Table C-6. Determinants of Redistribution Failure29 
 
 Variables Entered/Removed(b) 
 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
TalHQ_Sq, MainAL_perc, Khat_Change, Easement_Dummy, 
EncrRem_Dummy, Workers_perc, MargAL_perc, Land Type, 
Poss_Dummy, Val/Ac, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_05_perc, TOT_P, 
EncrRemGR_Dummy, BPL_15_Cumperc, SC_perc, 
DistrictHQ_Dist(a) 
. Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: Dal_04 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 
.782(a) .612 .567 .52152 
a  Predictors: (Constant), TalHQ_Sq, MainAL_perc, Khat_Change, Easement_Dummy, EncrRem_Dummy, 
Workers_perc, MargAL_perc, Land Type, Poss_Dummy, Val/Ac, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_05_perc, 
TOT_P, EncrRemGR_Dummy, BPL_15_Cumperc, SC_perc, DistrictHQ_Dist 
 
 ANOVA(b) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressio
n 
62.601 17 3.682 13.539 .000(a) 
Residual 39.710 146 .272     
1 
Total 102.311 163       
a  Predictors: (Constant), TalHQ_Sq, MainAL_perc, Khat_Change, Easement_Dummy, EncrRem_Dummy, 
Workers_perc, MargAL_perc, Land Type, Poss_Dummy, Val/Ac, TalHQ-DHQ_Distance, BPL_05_perc, 
TOT_P, EncrRemGR_Dummy, BPL_15_Cumperc, SC_perc, DistrictHQ_Dist 
b  Dependent Variable: Dal_04 
                                                 
29
 “Failure” here is taken to mean the combined instances of no land cultivation, or having foresworn, sold 
or otherwise broken the conditions of ownership of a parcel. 
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 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 
-.856 .650   -1.317 .190 
Land Type 
-.191 .118 -.120 -1.609 .110 
Poss_Dummy 
-.168 .136 -.076 -1.234 .219 
Easement_Du
mmy -.751 .280 -.147 -2.678 .008 
Khat_Change 
.253 .098 .148 2.590 .011 
EncrRem_Dum
my .624 .142 .364 4.395 .000 
EncrRemGR_D
ummy -.939 .158 -.529 -5.927 .000 
Val/Ac 
.000 .000 .165 2.602 .010 
TOT_P 
.000 .000 .513 7.146 .000 
BPL_05_perc 
-54.407 25.222 -.274 -2.157 .033 
BPL_15_Cump
erc 
3.426 1.353 .282 2.533 .012 
DistrictHQ_Dist 
-.037 .009 -.542 -4.223 .000 
MainAL_perc 
-4.173 .816 -.329 -5.114 .000 
MargAL_perc 
-2.766 1.100 -.171 -2.515 .013 
SC_perc 2.154 .873 .259 2.467 .015 
Workers_perc 4.011 .745 .410 5.386 .000 
TalHQ-
DHQ_Distance .009 .007 .115 1.270 .206 
1 
TalHQ_Sq 
.002 .000 .392 4.290 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: Dal_04 
 
 
